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 Abortion and Disgust
Courtney Megan Cahill*
This Article uses disgust theory — defined as the insights on disgust by psychol-
ogists and social scientists — to critique disgust’s role in abortion lawmaking.
Its starting point is a series of developments that independently highlight and
call into question the relationship between abortion and disgust.  First, the Su-
preme Court introduced disgust as a valid basis for abortion regulation in its
2007 case Gonzales v. Carhart.  Second, psychologists have recently discovered
a sufficiently strong association between individual disgust sensitivity and abor-
tion opposition to suggest that disgust might drive that opposition.  They have
also discovered that “abortion disgust” appears to be unrelated to harm con-
cerns — e.g., harm to the fetus — on which oppositional abortion rhetoric and
restrictive abortion laws often explicitly rest.  Third, legislatures around the
country have passed hundreds of restrictive abortion laws in 2010 and 2011.  If
moral psychologists are right, then disgust underwrites most, if not all, of those
laws.
Taking these developments seriously, this Article synthesizes the key in-
sights of psychology, social science, and sex equality scholarship to make two
arguments, one descriptive and the other constitutional.  First, abortion disgust
is not a reaction to harm to the mother or to death of the fetus, but rather to
perceived gender role violations by women.  Second, this genealogy of abortion
disgust constitutes the best reason why we ought to reject disgust as a basis for
abortion regulation, allied as that emotion is to unconstitutional sex stereotyping
— or what the Court has called unconstitutional “role typing.”  This Article
concludes by suggesting that “rejecting disgust” in abortion lawmaking might
mean subjecting all abortion laws to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, given disgust’s likely role in animating all abortion regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year marked the fifth anniversary of Gonzales v. Carhart,1 the Su-
preme Court’s most recent abortion decision, in which it upheld the first-ever
federal ban on abortion.2 Gonzales was a landmark decision for several rea-
sons.  First, it signaled the Court’s adoption of a woman-protective justifica-
tion for restricting access to abortion.3  Second, it signaled the Court’s virtual
abandonment of the common law informed consent doctrine in the abortion
context.4  Third, as discussed more fully below, it signaled the introduction
of an entirely new rationale for abortion regulation: disgust.5  Even as the
Court jettisoned disgust as a valid basis to regulate homosexuality in its
2003 landmark case Lawrence v. Texas,6 it sanctioned disgust as a valid basis
to regulate homosexuality’s culture war companion, abortion, just four years
later.7
1 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
2 See id. at 124 (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531
(2006)).
3 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity and the Politics
of Protection] (discussing Gonzales’s woman-protective justification); see also Reva B. Siegel,
Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitu-
tional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 834–38 (2007) (discussing the woman-protective justi-
fication in restrictive abortion legislation) [hereinafter Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for
Reproductive Rights].
4 See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abor-
tion, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1602–03 (2008); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emo-
tional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 24–27 (2007).
5 See Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories
of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1514, 1588 (2008).
6 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see id. at 577 (“The fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting))).  In Lawrence, the Court rejected morality as a legitimate state interest
for laws criminalizing consensual sexual relations between persons of the same sex. See id.
Given that disgust is a particularly extreme form or manifestation of moral judgment, we can
presume that in rejecting morality the Court rejected disgust as well.
7 For a fuller discussion of Gonzales’s disgust rationale, see infra notes 58–77 and accom-
panying text.  Whether Lawrence stands for the proposition that morality (and therefore dis-
gust) is never a valid constitutional basis for legal regulation is open to dispute.  The Eleventh
Circuit, for instance, has more than once questioned the validity of Lawrence’s rejection of
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In the six years since Gonzales was decided, abundant critical attention
has focused on the Gonzales majority’s woman-protective rationale and on
why it undercuts constitutional sex equality norms.8  Remarkably, though,
very little critical attention has centered on the Gonzales majority’s deploy-
ment of disgust and on why it undercuts those same norms.  Even as disgust
emerges from Gonzales as a valid basis for abortion regulation, and even as
scholars have criticized disgust’s role in other legal contexts9 and have
demonstrated a strong association between disgust and abortion opposition,10
morality as a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1318
(11th Cir. 2007) (finding that “public morality survives as a rational basis for legislation even
after Lawrence,” and therefore affirming a lower court ruling upholding Alabama’s law
criminalizing the distribution of sex toys); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family
Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (favorably citing pre-Lawrence cases where
the Court concluded “that there is not only a legitimate interest, but a substantial government
interest in protecting order and morality” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).  As to the
role of morality in lawmaking after Lawrence, Professor William Eskridge has remarked that
“few constitutional scholars think the narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence [on this
question] is correct.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2005); see also Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004) (examining the constitutional status of morals-based
legislation after Lawrence).
8 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81
S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 882 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict
and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1641–43,
1649–50 (2008); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Ratio-
nale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2008); Rebecca E. Ivey, Note, Destabilizing Dis-
courses: Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1451, 1452–53 (2008); see also Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note
3, at 1712–33; Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of
Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2008).
9 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (2010) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY]
(rejecting disgust as a valid basis for laws criminalizing same-sex relations and laws prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
AND THE LAW 256–71 (2004) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY] (same);
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW 19, 45 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) [hereinafter Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”]
(arguing that disgust is never a valid basis for legal regulation); Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-
Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on
Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1577–1601
(2005) (critiquing disgust-based arguments against same-sex relationships); Eskridge, supra
note 7, passim (rejecting disgust as a valid basis for regulating a variety of out groups, includ-
ing sexual minorities and people with disabilities); Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-
Predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Inva-
sions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 557–62
(2002) (critiquing disgust-based arguments in favor of enhanced sex offender legislation).  For
legal scholars who have taken a different position on this issue, see WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE
ANATOMY OF DISGUST 17–18 (1997) (considering disgust as an indispensable feature of cul-
ture); Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1621
(1998) (reviewing MILLER, supra, making the liberal case for disgust’s operation in lawmak-
ing); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at 17–18 (mak-
ing the conservative case for disgust’s operation in lawmaking).
10 Abortion has been described as conduct with high “‘yuck’ potential.” DANIEL KELLY,
YUCK!  THE NATURE AND MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DISGUST 150 (2011).  Recent empirical
 412 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 48
the abortion-disgust relationship remains curiously under-evaluated.11 Re-
markable on its own, such under-evaluation is strategically undesirable con-
sidering that in the past two years, hundreds of restrictive abortion laws have
been passed in the United States12 — including laws that address issues, like
fetal pain, that are highly susceptible to provoking disgust.13  Thus, it is not
work by moral psychologists certainly confirms this intuition. See infra notes 85–99 and ac-
companying text.
11 This is not to say that legal scholars have completely ignored the relationship between
abortion and disgust.  For instance, Professor Sonia Suter has addressed disgust in the abortion
context at some length. See Suter, supra note 5, passim.  In that article, however, she is princi-
pally concerned with considering how Gonzales’s repugnance rationale would or could affect
laws regulating alternative reproductive technologies rather than with considering disgust’s
role in the abortion context specifically. Id. at 1588–89.  In addition, Professor Suter does not
apply disgust theory to abortion regulation, as this Article does. See id.  Similarly, Professor
Terry A. Maroney refers to the Gonzales Court’s reliance on disgust in her article Emotional
Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 900 (2009).  However, she only
applies disgust theory to Gonzales briefly in a few footnotes. See id. at 900–01 nn. 216 & 217.
Finally, Professor Eskridge alludes to the abortion-disgust connection, but only in passing. See
Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1014 (arguing that “[t]he continuing legitimacy of such a politics
[of disgust and contagion] has serious consequences for women seeking abortions, people
with disabilities, lesbians, gay men, and transgendered people in the United States”).
12 See, e.g., Editorial, The Courts Step In: Judges’ Recent Rulings Show How Extreme
Antiabortion Measures Have Become, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2011, at A26 (referring to the
“extreme anti-abortion, anti-family-planning movement accelerating in the states and in Wash-
ington”); Erik Eckholm, New Laws in 6 States Ban Abortions After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2011, at A10 (stating that “dozens of new restrictions passed by states this year have
chipped away at the right to abortion by requiring women to view ultrasounds, imposing wait-
ing periods or cutting funds for clinics”); States Enact a Record Number of Abortion Restric-
tions in First Half of 2011, THE GUTTMACHER INST. (July 13, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.
org/media/inthenews/2011/07/13/index.html; Dahlia Lithwick, The Death of Roe v. Wade,
SLATE (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/
04/the_death_of_roe_v_wade.html (reporting that as of April 2011, “916 measures seeking to
regulate reproductive health have been introduced in 49 states”); State Legislative Trends:
Hostility to Abortion Rights Increases, THE GUTTMACHER INST. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.
guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2011/04/12/index.html; Jennifer Steinhauer, Under Banner of
Fiscal Restraint, Republicans Plan New Abortion Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A18
(noting that the United States House of Representatives is “more pro-life than it’s ever been”).
13 See Eckholm, supra note 12 (discussing fetal pain laws); see also infra note 80 and
accompanying text.  As of the writing of this Article, nine states have passed fetal pain laws
that ban abortion at twenty-weeks gestation and beyond on the basis of the pain that fetuses
purportedly feel at that point during pregnancy. See Kathryn Smith, Abortion-Rights Groups
Absent on Fetal Pain Laws, POLITICO (Aug. 13, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0812/79681.html?hp=r3.  Some commentators have argued that fetal pain laws
are “absolutely unconstitutional” or “clearly unconstitutional,” see Eckholm, supra note 12,
because they categorically ban abortion before viability in violation of both Roe and Casey.
Notwithstanding these statutes’ dubious constitutionality, only one fetal pain law has been
challenged in court — unsuccessfully — on constitutional grounds. See Isaacson v. Horne,
884 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971 (D. Ariz. 2012) (upholding Arizona’s fetal pain law that bans abor-
tion at twenty-weeks gestation).  Professor I. Glenn Cohen has argued that fetal pain laws
“present a major threat to abortion rights as we know them.”  I. Glenn Cohen, The Flawed
Basis Behind Fetal-Pain Abortion Laws, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.washington
post.com/opinions/the-flawed-basis-behind-fetal-pain-abortion-laws/2012/08/01/gJQAS0w8
PX_story.html.  “[I]t is entirely possible,” Professor Cohen remarks, “that [fetal pain laws]
will garner five votes on the current Supreme Court and change the face of abortion law as we
know it.” Id.  For a nuanced consideration of fetal pain legislation’s constitutionality, see I.
Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability and the Constitution, 39 J.L.
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just that disgust can and does play a role in abortion law, but that disgust
will continue to play such a role moving forward.
Taking these developments as its starting point, this Article is the first
to combine disgust theory, defined here as the insights on disgust by psy-
chologists and social scientists, and constitutional sex equality scholarship to
critique the abortion-disgust relationship.  It first looks to disgust theory to
establish the following: (1) that disgust for abortion exists; (2) that “abortion
disgust,” as this Article refers to it, animates abortion opposition and restric-
tive abortion laws; and (3) that abortion disgust reflects an extreme discom-
fort with the disruption of gender norms that abortion represents.  It then
uses this genealogy of abortion disgust to make a constitutional argument,
namely, that abortion disgust raises concern in light of the “anti-stereotyping
principle” in sex discrimination law.14  The tension between abortion disgust
and that principle might be the best reason why courts should scrutinize all
abortion classifications for unconstitutional sex stereotyping, and not just
those in which sex stereotyping is explicit.
Recent findings from moral psychology on the abortion-disgust rela-
tionship ought to prompt deeper inquiry into the emotion — disgust — that
possibly underwrites a large swath of abortion opposition.  These findings
suggest not only that disgust might be playing a formative role in driving
abortion opposition and its attendant laws,15 but also that something other
than concerns about harm to the mother or to the fetus is driving that dis-
gust.16  They raise the question of what, if not concerns about harm, is driv-
ing abortion disgust and its attendant laws?  Indeed, what is the genealogy of
this emotion that appears to fuel the abortion taboo?  And what does that
genealogy mean as a constitutional matter, particularly now that disgust has
received the Supreme Court’s blessing in the abortion context?
This Article ties together key insights of social science and sex discrim-
ination scholarship to answer these questions.  It first uses a particular theory
of disgust — one which has been called one of the “most famous” theories
of disgust17 and “one of the leading anthropological” theories of the twenti-
eth century18 — to answer the descriptive question of what beyond harm
explains abortion disgust.  Mary Douglas, the renowned anthropologist and
expositor of that theory, famously argued that nothing is inherently disgust-
MED. & ETHICS 235, 241 (2011).  For the relationship between disgust and fetal pain legisla-
tion, see infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
14 Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 83 (2010); see also id. at 158 (stating that the Court’s recent sex
equality jurisprudence “situates abortion regulation in a new constitutional space — one con-
strained by the anti-stereotyping principle”).
15 See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
17 NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 9, at 91 (referring to Mary Douglas’s
theory of disgust as one of the two “most famous” disgust theories).
18 John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (ob-
serving that “[s]cholars now recognize [Douglas’s] work [on pollution] as one of the leading
anthropological writings of the twentieth century”).
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ing.  Rather, disgust is our reaction to “matter out of place.”19  Things (and
people) disgust, Douglas wrote, when they confuse social roles and deviate
from cultural norms.  In her words, things disgust when they “confuse ac-
cepted classifications”20 and violate “[our] cherished classifications.”21  As
Professor William Miller explains, “[i]n Douglas’s scheme it is the anoma-
lous, the things that don’t fit the classificatory principles, that pollute.”22
Scholars have used Douglas’s social theory of disgust to better understand a
range of legal issues, from pornography laws23 and environmental pollution
regulation,24 to prohibitions on sodomy25 and same-sex marriage.26  This Ar-
ticle uses her theory to understand better the genealogy of abortion disgust.
More specifically, it argues that Douglas’s theory of disgust helps to illumi-
nate the principal driver of abortion disgust: the idea that women would
renounce motherhood given the opportunity to embrace it.  Such women,
this view contends, violate “[our] cherished classifications”27 and “confuse
[our] accepted classifications”28 in a way that provokes extreme discomfort
and often disgust.  As a recent sociological study on abortion stigma pro-
posed, “a woman who seeks an abortion is inadvertently challenging widely-
held assumptions about the ‘essential nature’ of women.”29  Such women, its
authors maintain, are stigmatized for being “inferior to ideals of
womanhood.”30
After describing Douglas’s social role theory of disgust and applying it
to abortion, this Article uses it to make a constitutional equality argument.
Over the past thirty years, constitutional law theorists have been increasingly
interested in illuminating sex discrimination law’s anti-stereotyping principle
19 See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POLLU-
TION AND TABOO 44 (1966) [hereinafter DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER]; see also MARY
DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS: SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 109 (2002) [hereinafter
DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS].
20 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 109; see also DOUGLAS, PURITY AND
DANGER, supra note 19, at 45.
21 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 109.
22 MILLER, supra note 9, at 44.
23 See John Copeland Nagle, Pornography as Pollution, 70 MD. L. REV. 939, 946 (2010)
(using Douglas’s theory of pollution to understand pornography regulation).
24 See Nagle, supra note 18, passim (explaining Douglas’s theory and using it to under-
stand environmental pollution).
25 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1388–89 (2010)
(using Douglas’s social theory of disgust to explain persistent animus against same-sex
couples); Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1025–26 (using Douglas’s theory of pollution to under-
stand disgust for sodomy as well as other “phenomena and practices that do not fit labels or
that cross lines”).
26 See Cahill, supra note 9, at 1579–83 (using Douglas’s theory to understand disgust’s
operation in the debate over same-sex marriage and in criminal incest laws).
27 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 109.
28 Id.
29 Anuradha Kumar et al., Conceptualising Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE, HEALTH &
SEXUALITY 625, 628 (2009).
30 Id. at 628.
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and in making the equality argument for the abortion right.31  Most notable
among them is Professor Reva Siegel, who has recently advanced the equal-
ity argument for abortion through a careful analysis of woman-protective
anti-abortion rhetoric.32
This Article furthers and deepens the sex equality project of Professor
Siegel and others by viewing abortion regulation through the theoretical lens
of disgust.  Doing so, it submits, suggests that restrictive abortion laws
might violate the anti-stereotyping principle even when they do not contain
overtly sexist rhetoric.  Indeed, the theory of abortion disgust advanced here
suggests that all restrictive abortion laws, not just those that explicitly ideal-
ize women as mothers or that purport to protect women, are vulnerable to
equality challenges because a disruptor of egalitarian norms — disgust —
plays such a powerful role in giving rise to them.
This Article unfolds in four parts.  Part I provides an overview of dis-
gust’s operation in abortion law.  It looks in particular at the Supreme Court
case that validated disgust as a constitutional basis for abortion regulation,
Gonzales v. Carhart, and at the wealth of recent empirical work in moral
psychology establishing a relationship between disgust and abortion opposi-
tion.  The objective of this Part is twofold: (1) to show that disgust is a
constitutional basis for abortion regulation; and (2) to suggest that disgust
likely plays a role in a large swath of abortion regulation, not just in the
regulation of controversial issues like dilation and extraction (“D&X”) abor-
tion, the procedure at issue in Gonzales.  Moreover, this Part sets the
groundwork for considering the best reason why we ought to be wary of
disgust’s presence in abortion law (the one reason that scholars have
missed): because of the constitutional equality norms that abortion disgust
disrupts.
Parts II and III then make the case for how, exactly, abortion disgust
disrupts those norms.  Part II uses disgust theory to dig deeper into the abor-
tion-disgust relationship and to unearth a moral genealogy of abortion dis-
gust.  Part III, in turn, uses that genealogy to argue that abortion disgust (and
the laws that flow from it) conflicts with the anti-stereotyping principle in
constitutional sex equality law.  Part IV concludes by briefly considering
what it would mean for the legal community to “reckon” with explicit and
implicit disgust in abortion lawmaking, particularly given disgust’s seem-
ingly pervasive presence there.33
31 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights, supra note
3, passim; see also infra notes 270–72 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Wo-
man-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 991, 1020 (2007).
33 I am borrowing this term from Professor Charles Lawrence’s iconic article, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).  The relevance of Lawrence’s article to this project will be treated infra in Part IV.
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I. ABORTION, DISGUST, AND LAW: AN OVERVIEW
This Part provides an overview of abortion and disgust in the law.  Sec-
tion A reviews the evolution of disgust-based reasoning and rhetoric in Su-
preme Court abortion jurisprudence, paying particular attention to its role in
Gonzales.  Section B reviews recent studies in moral psychology that pro-
vide a solid basis for arguing that disgust likely plays a role in a wide variety
of abortion regulations, not just in the kind of regulation that was at issue in
Gonzales.  Section C discusses the arguments some scholars have offered
against disgust in abortion regulation and introduces constitutional sex
equality norms as the best justification for why we ought to be concerned
about its presence there.
A. Disgust May (as a Constitutional Matter) Drive Abortion Law
The Supreme Court has been considering the abortion issue for almost
forty years, and during that time, disgust has evolved from playing no role
whatsoever in abortion decisions to becoming an independent justification
for abortion restrictions.  The Court first grappled with the abortion issue in
1973, the year it established the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v.
Wade34 and Doe v. Bolton.35  Justice Blackmun opened Roe’s majority opin-
ion by declaring that emotions — and therefore, by implication, disgust36 —
must play no part in abortion jurisprudence, intoning that “[o]ur task . . . is
to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection.”37  Coming from a Justice elsewhere accused of engaging in a
“legally unsophisticated and overly emotional . . . jurisprudence of senti-
ment,”38 and considering that abortion is arguably the most hotly contested
right in Supreme Court history,39 Blackmun’s promise to approach it “free of
emotion” is nothing short of remarkable.
34 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see id. at 164 (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause protects a fundamental right to privacy that includes abortion, and striking
down Texas’s criminal abortion law for violating that right).
35 410 U.S. 179 (1973); see id. at 201 (holding that a Georgia law requiring that a woman
obtain approval for an abortion from a hospital abortion committee and limiting abortion to
Georgia residents violated the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause).
36 The six basic and universally recognized emotions are disgust, anger, fear, happiness,
sadness, and surprise. See RACHEL HERZ, THAT’S DISGUSTING: UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES
OF REPULSION 29 (2012).
37 Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
38 Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun,
NEW REPUBLIC (May 2, 1994), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/sentimental-journey (criti-
cizing Justice Blackmun’s “jurisprudence of sentiment”).  For an examination of Justice Black-
mun’s abortion rhetoric generally, see Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and
Emotion in Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 232–34 (2002).
39 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 876 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that there is no “hotter” issue than “the issue of abortion rights”), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271
(2000).
 2013] Abortion and Disgust 417
As Supreme Court decisions go, Roe largely delivers on its promise to
resolve the abortion issue with dispassion.  If anything, Justice Blackmun’s
majority opinion has been criticized for its lack of emotion and for reading
more like a history lesson or a medical treatise than an impassioned vindica-
tion of either the right of the fetus or the right of the woman.40  Perhaps more
surprising is the fact that disgust is absent from the two dissents as well.
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, in fact, even commends the majority opinion as
one that “commands my respect,” resting as it does on “extensive historical
fact and a wealth of legal scholarship.”41
Disgust first surfaced in Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence in a few
dissenting opinions in 2000, the year that the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a state D&X ban in Stenberg v. Carhart.42  Popularly known by
its non-medical name — “partial-birth” abortion43 — D&X is an infre-
quently used second-trimester abortion procedure that involves the termina-
tion of an intact fetus.  It is a later-term (though not necessarily a late-term)
method of abortion, one that provoked intense public opposition after it was
first publicized in 1992.44
40 See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING ix (2010) (“The wo-
men’s movement and the right-to-life movement shaped arguments made to the Court in Roe.
But the Court responded to these arguments only indirectly.”); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1625 (1987) (critiquing the unemotional aspects of
Roe’s majority opinion and arguing that it is “virtually free of the story of women”).
41 Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice White, who undoubtedly writes
the most emotional of all of Roe’s opinions, directs his vehemence primarily toward the major-
ity for its “exercise of raw judicial power” in inventing a “new constitutional right.”  Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221–22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
42 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a state law banning “partial-birth” abortion as a
violation of the abortion right under the Fourteenth Amendment).
43 On the origin of the term “partial-birth” abortion, see Julie Rovner, “Partial-Birth”
Abortion: Separating Fact From Spin, NPR (Feb. 21, 2006, 9:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5168163.  Rovner reports that “partial-birth” is “not a
medical term,” but rather “a political” one, a term that
was first coined by the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) in 1995 to de-
scribe a recently introduced medical procedure to remove fetuses from the womb.
Alternately known as “dilation and extraction,” or D&X, and “intact D&E,” it in-
volves removing the fetus intact by dilating a pregnant woman’s cervix, then pulling
the entire body out through the birth canal.
Id.
44 Not long after Dr. Martin Haskell first publicized the procedure in 1992, a wave of
criminal D&X abortion statutes, including the federal statute upheld in Gonzales, swept the
nation. See generally MARTIN HASKELL, DILATION AND EXTRACTION FOR LATE SECOND TRI-
MESTER ABORTION (1992), reprinted in 139 CONG. REC. E1092 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1993), and
in The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 5 (1995).  In one D&X case, Judge Richard Posner remarked that the legislative
frenzy surrounding “partial-birth” abortion did “not exhibit the legislative process at its best,
whatever one thinks of abortion rights.” Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 880 (Posner, C.J., dissent-
ing).  For the chain of events leading from Dr. Haskell’s presentation on intact dilation and
extraction to the enactment of the federal “partial birth” ban, see Siegel, Dignity and the
Politics of Protection, supra note 3, at 1707 n.40.
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In Stenberg, a divided Court struck down Nebraska’s criminal D&X
statute for two reasons.  First, the statute failed to contain a health exception,
as required under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.45  Second, the statute amounted to an unconstitutional “‘undue bur-
den’ upon a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”46
Although Stenberg struck down a D&X statute on constitutional grounds, it
marked disgust’s entry into the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence.47  In
fact, one could argue that D&X abortion — a procedure highly susceptible
to graphic depictions and visceral reactions — represented an opportunity
seen and seized by abortion opponents to introduce disgust into the abortion
debate.  As one abortion opponent put it, the very term “partial-birth abor-
tion” was “thought up in hopes that ‘as the public learns what a “partial-
birth abortion” is, they might also learn something about other abortion
methods, and that this would foster a growing opposition to abortion.’” 48
Disgust is the predominant lexicon not of the Stenberg majority, but
rather of those Justices in dissent.49  Justice Scalia (who generally “reserves
his angriest work product” for abortion50), Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas characterize D&X, as well as abortion procedures that remain legal
45 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938 (finding that the Nebraska statute violated Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992), which requires abortion laws to
include a health exception for procedures that are “necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother” (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 165
(1973))).
46 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938.  The “undue burden” test was announced in Casey, 505 U.S.
at 877 (requiring courts to ask whether a law regulating abortion “has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus”).
47 Indeed, the D&X controversy gave the Court its very first occasion to describe in
graphic detail all abortion procedures, including those that remain legal today. See Stenberg,
530 U.S. at 983 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that “[i]n the almost 30 years since Roe,
this Court has never described the various methods of aborting a second- or third-trimester
fetus”).  It is no surprise, then, that disgust first entered the Supreme Court’s abortion lexicon
in the “partial-birth” context.
48 See Rovner, supra note 43 (quoting Douglas Johnson of the NRLC).
49 That said, there are also some indications in the majority opinion that D&X makes even
its supporters squirm.  Justice Breyer, for instance, prefaces the section of his Stenberg major-
ity opinion that describes D&X, among other abortion methods, with a “reader beware” mo-
ment.  He says:
Considering the fact that those procedures seek to terminate a potential human life,
our discussion may seem clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to
others.  There is no alternative way, however, to acquaint the reader with the techni-
cal distinctions among different abortion methods and related factual matters, upon
which the outcome of this case depends.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 923.  Breyer’s caveat lector moment arguably provokes the dread and
disgust that it anticipates.  In so doing, it quite possibly amplifies the “horrifying” details of
the technical abortion descriptions that follow. Compare id. at 923, with Hope Clinic, 195
F.3d at 861 (framing a discussion of abortion’s technical aspects in a decision upholding the
constitutionality of criminal abortion laws by simply stating that “[s]ome medical background
is essential to understanding the issues”).
50 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 459 (2011).
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today, in disgust-driven terms, calling them “barbarian,”51 “abhorrent,”52
“gruesome,”53 and “so horrible” as to evoke “a shudder of revulsion.”54
Moreover, they describe abortion procedures, including but not limited to
D&X, at length and in graphic detail.  If sodomy was for many jurists the
“crime not fit to be named,”55 then abortion, for the Stenberg dissenters, is a
crime that cannot help but speak its name — and in agonizing detail.56
Three years after the Stenberg ruling, Congress passed, and President
George W. Bush signed into law, the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
(“Act”), which made the performance of a D&X abortion a federal crime.57
Four years after that, in Gonzales v. Carhart, a divided Court upheld the Act,
despite the fact that it failed to contain a health exception, as required under
Stenberg and other abortion precedent, and despite the fact that it categori-
cally prohibited a pre-viability method of abortion.58  Characterized by one
commentator as a decision with “narrow and modest language,”59 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Gonzales is “modest” in the Swiftean sense
only — not just with respect to what it holds but also, and perhaps espe-
cially, with respect to how it gets there.60
Justice Kennedy’s Gonzales opinion reads in many ways like his
Stenberg dissent, from his initial framing of the Court’s discussion of abor-
tion procedures,61 to the targeted lexicon he employs throughout that discus-
sion,62 to his graphic and lengthy abortion descriptions — descriptions that
reveal to readers “more than they ever wanted to know about the mechanics
51 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 954 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the federal Act as an
“anti-barbarian law”).
52 Id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 983 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *218.
56 If judicial disgust for homosexuality historically took the linguistic form of preterition
— the rhetorical device whereby the speaker emphasizes something by omitting it or by ada-
mantly refusing to talk about it — then judicial disgust for abortion in Stenberg takes the
linguistic form of excess. See Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving
Beyond Race to Explain Why Separate Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will
Never Be “Equal,” 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1178 (2009) (discussing preterition in the context of
legal discussions of homosexuality/sodomy).
57 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
58 550 U.S. 124, 165, 147 (2007).
59 Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1517, 1521 (2008).
60 See, e.g., Garrett Epps & Dahlia Lithwick, The Sphinx of Sacramento: Will the Real
Justice Kennedy Please Stand Up?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2007, 6:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/04/the_sphinx_of_sacramento.html (referring
to the “visceral horror” that emerges from Kennedy’s Gonzales and Stenberg opinions).
61 Compare Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 134 (stating that “[t]he Act proscribes a particular
manner of ending fetal life, so it is necessary here, as it was in Stenberg, to discuss abortion
procedures in some detail”), with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 958 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “it seems necessary at the outset to set forth what may happen during
an abortion”).
62 That lexicon includes labeling doctors who perform abortions “abortion doctors,” Gon-
zales, 550 U.S. at 144, referring to a woman who obtains an abortion as a “mother” (even after
her pregnancy is terminated), id. at 159, and variously describing a fetus as an “unborn child”
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of abortion.”63  He variously refers to D&X as conduct that “implicates . . .
ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition,” and as a proce-
dure that “perverts a process during which life is brought into the world.”64
Finally, he directs the medical profession to “find . . . less shocking methods
to abort the fetus in the second trimester.”65
Disgust, however, is not just Gonzales’s dominant linguistic register.  It
is also one of the primary rationales on which the majority rests its decision
to uphold the federal D&X ban.  Along with maternal regret,66 disgust
emerges from Gonzales as an “entirely new justification for prohibiting cer-
tain abortion procedures,”67 and one which “no prior case dealing with re-
productive rights has described.”68  To be sure, the Gonzales majority never
explicitly states that “disgust” is a valid basis for abortion regulation.  It
does, however, uphold the Act to “express[] respect for the dignity of
and a “baby.” Id.  Justice Ginsburg criticizes the majority for using these terms. See id. at
186–87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63 Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1234 (2010).  Professor Suk remarks that “the text of Carhart . . . told
readers more than they ever wanted to know about the mechanics of abortion.  In so doing it
produced one of the opinion’s most criticized features — its graphic description of the proce-
dures at issue.” Id.  Kennedy’s “graphic description” of abortion in Gonzales is the rhetorical
analogue to anti-abortion advocacy’s disgust-driven visual imagery. See id. at 1235 (noting
that “[c]ommentators have suggested that such graphic details in Carhart’s text express revul-
sion with abortion, much in the way that some antiabortion advocacy deploys graphic repre-
sentations”).  For disgust’s role in “visual” abortion rhetoric, see Nick Hopkins et al.,
Visualising Abortion: Emotion Discourse and Fetal Imagery in a Contemporary Abortion De-
bate, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 393, 398 (2005) (stating that certain visual images of abortion are
“portrayed as providing a window on reality,” and that “strong emotional reactions of dis-
gust” to those images “are construed as deserving of attention and respect for the information
that they convey”); see also Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual
Culture in the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 263 (1987) (discussing also
the cultural impact images of abortion touted to be realistic have).
64 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, 160.  One is here reminded that combating “perversion”
was a rationale to which certain members of Congress adverted in support of the federal De-
fense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) during debates over that law.  In the floor debate over
DOMA, members of Congress repeatedly expressed their aversion to homosexuality, calling it
“immoral,” 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn)
[hereinafter Statement of Coburn]; “depraved,” 142 CONG. REC. H7486 (daily ed. July 12,
1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer) [hereinafter Statement of Buyer]; “unnatural,” id. at H7494
(statement of Rep. Smith); “based on perversion,” Statement of Coburn, supra; and “an attack
upon God’s principles,” Statement of Buyer, supra.
65 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160.
66 Professor Siegel observes that Gonzales marked the first time that the Court adopted “a
woman-protective justification for restricting access to abortion.”  Siegel, Sex Equality Argu-
ments for Reproductive Rights, supra note 3, at 837.  For the history of the woman-protective
justification in anti-abortion advocacy generally, see id. at 835 & nn. 67–68.  The logic of that
justification is as follows: the “bond of love the mother has for her child” represents the
“ultimate expression” of “[r]espect for human life.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.  Given this
(conclusory) fact, women could suffer from intense regret, anguish, and grief upon discovering
the gruesome particulars of D&X after having one. See id.  Thus, far from amounting to an
unconstitutional undue burden, the federal D&X ban eliminates the burden that is truly undue
for women: post-abortion regret.
67 Suter, supra note 5, at 1580.
68 Id.
 2013] Abortion and Disgust 421
human life,”69 and to protect society from becoming “coarsen[ed]” by the
knowledge that such a “brutal and inhumane procedure” not only exists but
is legal.70  In other words, it upholds the Act for purely expressive reasons,
suggesting that repugnance to abortion — or, at least, to a particular abortion
procedure — is a good enough reason to ban it.  Moreover, the Act’s under-
inclusivity raises the strong possibility that disgust concerns, rather than
“human life” concerns, were its primary motivation.  As Justice Ginsburg
remarks in dissent, not one fetus is actually saved by the Act.71  Conse-
quently, the Act does not credibly advance a governmental interest (as the
majority asserts) in respecting “human life.”  Rather, the Act’s principal
concern is with minimizing (or eliminating) shock/disgust, and not with
minimizing (or eliminating) fetal harm.
The Gonzales majority in no way limits the “‘repugnance’ approach”72
that it embraces to a particular abortion procedure (i.e., to D&X) — or,
indeed, to abortion more generally.73  For this reason, some commentators
have suggested that Gonzales establishes a precedent for disgust or moral
judgment to play a more active role in abortion jurisprudence moving for-
ward.  Professor Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has argued that after Gonza-
les, any “sound medical procedure [may be outlawed] for no better reason
than that many find [that procedure] disturbing or immoral.”74  Professor
Sonia Suter echoes these concerns, arguing that “given the ultimately unper-
suasive grounds for upholding an abortion ban with no health exception,
Gonzales suggests that . . . repugnance can be sufficient justification for
limiting abortion rights.”75  Indeed, even Justice Ginsburg observes in her
Gonzales dissent that the “moral concerns” that the Court embraces “could
yield prohibitions on any abortion.”76  Thus, “moral concerns” — or, more
accurately, disgust concerns — are now constitutionally legitimate reasons
69 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157.
70 See, e.g., id. (citing approvingly to Congress’s statement that “[i]mplicitly approving
such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen soci-
ety to the humanity of . . . all vulnerable and innocent human life” (internal citation omitted)).
71 Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880
(7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (“[Criminal D&X statutes] are not concerned with
saving fetuses, with protecting fetuses from a particularly cruel death, with protecting the
health of women, with protecting viable fetuses, or with increasing the Wisconsin population
(as intimated, surely not seriously, by Wisconsin’s counsel).  They are concerned with making
a statement in an ongoing war for public opinion. . . .”), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
72 Suter, supra note 5, at 1583.
73 See id. at 1587 (discussing how Gonzales’s repugnance rationale might be used to jus-
tify restrictions on alternative reproductive technologies).
74 Ronald Dworkin, The Court & Abortion: Worse than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(May 31, 2007), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/may/31/the-court-abortion-
worse-than-you-think/?pagination=false.
75 Suter, supra note 5, at 1583.
76 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg also reminds the
majority that in prior abortion cases, the Court reasoned that such moral concerns “cannot
control our decision.” Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)).
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to regulate all abortion, and perhaps even to eliminate the abortion right
entirely.77
B. Disgust Likely (as a Factual Matter) Animates Abortion Law
Whereas Gonzales v. Carhart establishes that disgust may (as a consti-
tutional matter) drive abortion regulation, recent studies in moral psychology
suggest that disgust in fact does animate that regulation.  To be sure, some
may argue that we do not need moral psychology to tell us that disgust is
playing a role in abortion regulation because numerous other indicators of
abortion aversion in lawmaking exist.  For instance, some abortion regula-
tion — like D&X regulation — is so surrounded by such an explicit rhetoric
of disgust that disgust’s constitutive role in that regulation is obvious.78
Other abortion laws appear calculated to provoke disgust for abortion be-
cause of what they regulate and what they reach.  The recently enacted fetal
pain laws, for instance, target an issue — fetal pain — whose “disgust fac-
tor” is rather high.79  Premised on a medically contested claim,80 fetal pain
laws capture so few abortions performed annually (1%) that they appear
above all to be “merely exercises in symbolic lawmaking.”81  At least one
77 Whether such concerns are constitutionally valid in other contexts is unclear.  For in-
stance, in a recent free speech case, Justice Scalia reminded one of his colleagues that “disgust
is not a valid basis for restricting expression.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2738 (2011).  Moreover, the Court has suggested that disgust is an invalid basis under
the Fourteenth Amendment on which to justify discriminatory treatment of sexual minorities
generally and same-sex relations specifically. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003) (holding that morality does not constitute a legitimate state interest under the Due
Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that animus or hostility
against individuals on account of their membership in a class — there, sexual minorities —
does not constitute even a legitimate state interest under the Equal Protection Clause).
78 For instance, Judge Posner has suggested that the legal controversy surrounding D&X
abortion in the 1990s was driven principally by disgust for abortion rights generally.  In a case
considering the constitutionality of a state D&X ban, Judge Posner pointed out that the wave of
state D&X prohibitions did “not exhibit the legislative process at its best, whatever one thinks
of abortion rights.”  Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.,
dissenting), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).  “Whipped up,” as he put it, “by activists who
wanted to dramatize the ugliness of abortions,” id. at 881, the principal objective of these
statutes was to put abortion in the public eye — and, in so doing, to stir up the public’s disgust
for it. See also Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 3, at 1707 (“[Anti-
abortion advocates’] objective was to focus [D&X] legislation and litigation on visceral de-
tails of one infrequently employed second-trimester procedure, with the aim of stimulating
opposition to abortion generally.”).
79 Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates
Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 842 (2012).
80 Fetal pain laws, which prohibit abortion at twenty-weeks gestation and beyond, rest on
the “fact” that fetuses feel pain starting at twenty-weeks gestation.  Professor Pustilnik argues
that this claim “run[s] contrary to the current weight of medical evidence on fetal pain,”
which indicates that fetal pain occurs much later in a pregnancy, shortly before birth. Id. at
844.
81 Id. at 843, 846; see also id. at 844 (“These figures suggest that the legislation’s very
slight, practical impact on abortion procedures . . . could not by itself have justified the legisla-
tion’s passage.”).
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commentator has argued that “repugnance to abortion — not the issue of
fetal pain itself — is the driving force behind these statutes.”82
While we might already know that disgust plays a role in abortion regu-
lation, however, studies in moral psychology on the abortion-disgust rela-
tionship deepen that knowledge in a way that is legally significant for two
reasons.  First, the studies demonstrate that disgust likely plays a role in a
large swath of abortion regulation, not just in the regulation of particularly
controversial abortion procedures (like D&X abortion) or in the context of
particularly inflammatory abortion issues (like fetal pain).  As such, they
suggest that Justice Ginsburg’s prediction — that “moral concerns,” or what
this Article calls disgust concerns, “could yield prohibitions on any abor-
tion” — may very well ring true, if it has not already.  Second, the studies
suggest that it is not just disgust that is animating abortion regulation, but
disgust divorced from any concern about harm prevention.  As such, they
raise the possibility that restrictive abortion laws do not satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement that all laws rest in some way on harm prevention.83
Equally important, they provide a point of departure for thinking more criti-
cally about the genealogy of this emotion that, as of 2007, constitutes a legit-
imate basis for abortion regulation.
For the possibility that disgust plays a formative role in driving abortion
opposition generally, consider a 2009 study that tested disgust’s role in shap-
ing individuals’ political orientations.84  Among other things, the study’s au-
82 Id. at 843.
83 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (distinguishing between state regula-
tion of harmful versus non-harmful conduct, and maintaining that the state may not reach the
latter but may reach the former, which includes conduct involving “minors[,] . . . persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily
be refused[,] . . . public conduct[, and] prostitution”).
84 Yoel Inbar et al., Conservatives Are More Easily Disgusted than Liberals, 23 COGNI-
TION & EMOTION 714 (2008) [hereinafter Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted].  This study
received considerable media coverage and stimulated considerable academic interest in the
connections between disgust sensitivity and political ideology.  For media coverage, see, for
example, Jennifer Harper, Studies: Conservatives Easier to Disgust, WASH. TIMES (June 6,
2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/06/conservatives-more-easily-dis-
gusted-than-liberals/?page=all; Peter Liberman & David Pizarro, All Politics Is Olfactory,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/opinion/24pizarro.html.
Studies before this one found that disgust is an important moral foundation for conservatives in
particular, and that conservatives are more likely to agree that certain conduct should be cate-
gorically prohibited if it violates purity norms and is therefore disgusting, even if it is non-
harmful. See, e.g., Jesse Graham et al., Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of
Moral Foundations, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1029 (2009) (finding that
conservatives, more so than liberals, use purity and sanctity as moral intuitions); Jonathan
Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions
that Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 98, 108 (2007) (discussing the relative
importance of disgust as a moral intuition for conservatives); Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A.
Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 211–12 (2001) (discussing conservatives and disgust).  Moreover,
previous studies investigated “the possibility that conservatives are more likely than liberals to
experience disgust in response to specific behaviours that violate ideals of purity.”  Inbar et al.,
More Easily Disgusted, supra, at 715–16 (summarizing past research).  The 2009 study dis-
cussed here was the first to investigate “whether there is a broader relationship between dis-
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thors found that the more disgust-sensitive someone was, the more likely she
was to oppose the claim that “[a] woman should have the right to choose
what to do with her body, even if that means getting an abortion.”85  People
with a “[d]ispositional proneness to disgust” — that is, people who had a
general disposition to feeling disgusted by a variety of stimuli, including
core disgust elicitors like feces and rotting meat, as well as sexual disgust
elicitors like incest and zoophilia — were more likely to adopt conservative
political attitudes toward such issues as gay marriage and abortion.86  Even
controlling for the potentially confounding variable of religious affiliation,87
these scientists found that disgust sensitivity was highly predictive of politi-
cal conservatism in general and of conservative attitudes toward a range of
ideological issues in particular.  The authors found strong associations be-
tween disgust and politics; in particular, and of particular interest for this
Article, the strongest association was between disgust and abortion opposi-
tion.88  Combined, these findings suggest that disgust plays a formative role
in determining our political orientations in general and our ideological atti-
tude toward abortion in particular.89
Other studies of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral
judgment have made similar findings.  In one, scientists found that “the pri-
mary political attitudes affected by disgust sensitivity are those pertaining to
sex/reproduction,” including pornography, abortion rights, premarital sex,
and gay marriage.90  As in the previous study, here, people with heightened
disgust sensitivity were significantly more likely to oppose abortion, even
controlling for age and gender.  In fact, after controlling for age and gender,
abortion opposition was the political attitude relating to sex and reproduction
gust and political ideology — that is, whether a general disposition to feel disgusted by a
variety of stimuli, including non-social stimuli, is associated with conservatism.” Id. at 716.
Its authors predicted — correctly — that “a general disposition to feel disgust in a variety of
situations would be associated with greater self-reported conservatism as well as more con-
servative views on specific political issues.” Id.  The authors of the 2009 study have published
more recent studies that similarly demonstrate that “political conservatives are especially
likely to disapprove of acts and individuals that violate norms of sexual and bodily purity.”
Yoel Inbar et al., Disgust Sensitivity, Political Conservatism, and Voting, 3 SOC. PSYCHOL. &
PERSONALITY SCI. 537, 537 (2012) [hereinafter Inbar, Disgust Sensitivity].
85 Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted, supra note 84, at 723.
86 See id. at 721.
87 That is, the study’s authors regressed disgust sensitivity scores and religious affiliation
on conservatism to test whether the relationship between disgust sensitivity and conservatism
could be explained by subjects’ religious affiliation.  In so doing, they found that while
“[r]eligious affiliation of any kind (as opposed to atheism/agnosticism) significantly predicted
conservatism . . . disgust sensitivity remained a significant predictor as well.” Id. at 718.
Thus, they concluded, “religious affiliation does not appear to explain the relationship between
disgust sensitivity and conservatism.” Id.
88 See id. at 721 (summarizing data showing that “disgust sensitivity was related to a
greater disapproval of gay marriage and greater disapproval of abortion”).
89 See id. at 723.
90 Kevin B. Smith et al., The Ick Factor: Disgust Sensitivity as a Predictor of Political
Attitudes 14–15 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished paper), available at http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.
edu/myl/SmithDisgust2009.pdf.
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that correlated most strongly with a particular kind of disgust sensitivity
tested.91
In another study, individuals high in disgust sensitivity exhibited “more
negative intuitive moral evaluations of gay people and same-gender sexual
behavior” than did individuals low in disgust sensitivity.92  People who were
prone to experiencing disgust were also prone to making “harsher [intui-
tive] judgments” about sexual minorities.93  That study tested only the rela-
tionship between disgust sensitivity and intuitive disapproval of gay people,
not abortion.  Nevertheless, its findings are interesting to consider in the
abortion context because they suggest that people who experience disgust
quite easily will intuitively judge purity-related offenses like abortion with
more severe moral condemnation than will people who are less disgust-sen-
sitive.94  As the study’s authors put it, “[c]hronically experiencing disgust
. . . may make individuals chronically harsh moral judges.”95
These studies lend support to the proposition that the emotion of disgust
might influence abortion opposition and its resultant laws.  As such, they
contribute to scientists’ growing interest in the possibility that disgust causes
moral condemnation of certain behaviors, including abortion.96  Admittedly,
91 Id. at 27 tbl.2; see also Kevin B. Smith et al., Disgust Sensitivity and the Neurophysi-
ology of Left-Right Political Orientations, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2011) (summarizing similar
research); John A. Terrizzi, Jr. et al., Disgust: A Predictor of Social Conservatism and Prejudi-
cial Attitudes Toward Homosexuals, 49 PERS. & INDIV. DIFFERENCES 587, 590–91 (2010)
(demonstrating a very high correlation between disgust sensitivity and the political opinion
that “[a]bortion should be illegal,” and stating that while “disgust sensitivity was not predic-
tive of conservative political attitudes across the board,” it was predictive “of socially con-
servative political beliefs such as immigration, abortion, euthanasia, stem cell research,
medical marijuana, and homosexual marriage”).
92 Yoel Inbar et al., Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9 EMOTION
435, 438 (2009).
93 Id.
94 Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted, supra note 84, at 714 (describing abortion as a
“purity-related” issue); see also E.J. Horberg et al., Disgust and the Moralization of Purity, 97
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 963, 972 (2009) (arguing that disgust is “uniquely associ-
ated with the moralization of purity concerns,” and that “purity judgments [are] related only
to disgust” — as opposed to other emotions like anger or sadness).
95 Inbar et al., supra note 92, at 438.  In the most recent, and so far the largest, study on
the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political orientation, psychologists found that
“the relationship between DS [(‘disgust sensitivity’)] and conservatism held when controlling
for a number of individual-difference variables, including gender, age, education, religious
affiliation, and [religious] attendance.”  Inbar et al., Disgust Sensitivity, supra note 84, at 542.
That study found that disgust sensitivity was a significant predictor not only of conservative
political attitudes, but also of conservative political behavior.  For example, among the 25,588
individuals surveyed, those who showed the highest disgust sensitivity “were more likely to
report planning to vote for John McCain over Barack Obama” in the 2008 presidential elec-
tion. Id. at 540.
96 Since the 1990s, moral and social psychologists working in the area of disgust have
experimentally tested at least three claims: first, whether individuals feel disgust as a conse-
quence of moral violations; second, whether individuals’ disgust intensifies the severity of their
moral judgments; and third, whether individuals’ disgust actually causes them to view certain
behaviors as immoral. See generally D.A. Pizarro et al., On Disgust and Moral Judgment, 3
EMOTION REV. 267 (2011) (describing these claims).  They have found strong experimental
support for the first two claims, and “promising” experimental support for the third. Id.  That
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the studies here summarized do not directly measure whether people find
abortion disgusting or whether people believe that abortion should be illegal
because they find it disgusting; nor do they definitively establish a causal
relationship between disgust and morality.97  They do show, however, that
the emotion of disgust is highly predictive of our political orientations gener-
ally and of our ideological position toward abortion specifically.  Moreover,
they establish a sufficiently strong correlation between disgust sensitivity
and abortion opposition to suggest that disgust likely plays some kind of role
in shaping abortion opposition and its attendant laws — opposition not just
to a particular type of abortion (like D&X), but to abortion generally.98
In addition to finding a strong correlation between disgust sensitivity
and abortion opposition, researchers have also found a weak correlation be-
tween harm concerns and abortion opposition.  For instance, a 2012 study
found that concerns about disgust and purity were more significant
is, experiments overwhelmingly show that people tend to feel disgust when moral violations
occur (claim one), and that disgust “makes wrong things seem even more wrong” (claim two).
Id.  But experiments also suggest that disgust might cause individuals to view certain behav-
iors as wrong — that is, that individuals label certain behaviors immoral because they find
those behaviors to be disgusting (claim three). Id.  For studies on the possible causal relation-
ship between disgust and moral judgment, see generally HERZ, supra note 36; Horberg et al.,
supra note 94; Yoel Inbar et al., Disgusting Smells Cause Decreased Liking of Gay Men, 12
EMOTION 23 (2012); Andrew Jones & Julie Fitness, Moral Hypervigilance: The Influence of
Disgust Sensitivity in the Moral Domain, 8 EMOTION 613 (2008); Simone Schnall et al., Dis-
gust as Embodied Moral Judgment, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1096 (2008);
Thalia Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe,
16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 780 (2005).  The third claim (disgust drives moral judgment) is the converse
of the first (disgust follows moral judgment).
97 See Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted, supra note 84, at 723 (recognizing that the
present study did not “speak to [a] causal relationship between political attitudes and disgust
sensitivity”).  Nevertheless, the authors of one study maintain that it is unlikely that the rela-
tionship works the other way (that is, that political views drive disgust sensitivity), given that
disgust is “a basic emotion that emerges long before individuals form political attitudes.” Id.
If anything, it seems more likely that disgust, along with a host of other variables (including
geographical location), guides one’s political orientation. See id.
98 As to this latter point, consider what exactly the studies are measuring when they estab-
lish an association between disgust and abortion opposition.  One study measured abortion
opposition by asking participants to rate the extent to which they agreed with the statement
that “[a] woman should have the right to choose what to do with her body, even if that means
getting an abortion,” Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted, supra note 84, at 724 app.1, using a
seven-point scale that ranged from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” Id. at 719.
Another study measured abortion opposition by asking participants to rate themselves on a
five-point scale that ranged from “1” (or abortion is “morally acceptable in most or all cases”)
to “5” (or abortion is “morally wrong in most or all cases”).   Terrizzi, Jr. et al., supra note 91,
at 590.  Using this system, both studies found a significant positive association between dis-
gust sensitivity and “greater disapproval of abortion.”  Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted,
supra note 84, at 721.  By “greater disapproval of abortion,” these studies likely capture more
individuals than just those who currently support abolishing the abortion right entirely.  More-
over, they likely capture “disapproval” for more than just D&X abortion.  This observation is
significant because it suggests that disgust is playing a role not just in the D&X context and
not just for those Americans who oppose abortion in every circumstance.  Rather, or in addi-
tion, disgust is playing a role in other contexts and for other individuals as well.  Whereas
Gonzales suggests that the Court is willing to sanction disgust in law, even outside the D&X
context (Justice Ginsburg’s prediction), these studies suggest that many individuals actually
feel disgust in fact outside that context.
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predictors of individuals’ abortion opposition than either concerns about
harm or an individual’s political orientation (i.e., the fact that someone self-
identified as either liberal or conservative).99  The authors of that study used
moral foundations theory — the theory that “human groups construct moral
virtues, meanings, and institutions in variable ways by relying, to varying
degrees, on five innate psychological systems,”100 including harm/care, fair-
ness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity — to
determine the role that moral intuitions play, above and beyond political
affiliation and ideology, in driving individuals’ culture war positions.  They
found that the purity intuition, which is “based on the emotion of disgust,”101
was “the best foundation predictor of endorsing stricter abortion laws.”102
More specifically, subjects whose morality was shaped primarily by pu-
rity/disgust concerns, as determined by subjects’ responses to a “Moral
Foundations Questionnaire” (“MFQ”),103 were significantly more likely to
oppose abortion than those whose morality was shaped by a different moral
foundation, such as harm/care or fairness/reciprocity.  In fact, the purity/dis-
gust moral foundation was a more significant predictor of abortion opposi-
tion than were numerous other factors, including political orientation,
interest in politics, age, gender, and religious attendance.  With respect to the
harm moral foundation factor specifically, the study’s authors found that
moral disapproval for abortion “was far better predicted by Purity than by
Harm scores [on the MFQ].”104
The low correlation between harm concerns and abortion opposition
was notable to the study’s authors, who pointed out that the “political rheto-
ric about the morality of abortion . . . is often dominated by arguments about
(potential) harm,”105 whether harm to the fetus or harm to the woman seek-
ing an abortion.106 Contrary to this rhetoric, they argue, harm prevention
99 Spassena P. Koleva et al., Tracing the Threads: How Five Moral Concerns (Especially
Purity) Help Explain Culture War Attitudes, 46 J. RES. PERSONALITY 184, 188 (2012).
100 Id. at 185.  Jonathan Haidt has used moral foundations theory to help explain the stark
differences between liberals and conservatives — and particularly those on the extreme ends
of those two political orientations — on various culture war positions.  Through a series of
experiments, he has shown that liberals, and especially extreme liberals, rely almost exclu-
sively on the harm and fairness foundations when making moral judgments.  By contrast, con-
servatives, and especially extreme conservatives, rely on all five foundations (harm, fairness,
in-group, authority, and purity/disgust) when making those judgments. See generally Graham
et al., supra note 84; Haidt & Graham, supra note 84 (discussing the importance of disgust as a
moral intuition for conservatives); Haidt & Hersh, supra note 84.  Haidt has summarized this
research in a recently published book. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND:
WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012).
101 Koleva et al., supra note 99, at 185.
102 Id. at 189.
103 The MFQ has been widely used by moral psychologists to measure “the extent to
which an individual endorses each of five types of moral concerns.” Id. at 186.
104 Id. at 188.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 3, at 1706; Siegel,
supra note 32, at 992 (citing abortion opponents’ concerns “about protecting women as well as
the unborn”).
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“may sometimes be only loosely connected to the intuitions that motivated
the [anti-abortion] attitude in the first place.”107
But the low correlation between harm concerns and abortion opposition
is notable for another reason that the study’s authors did not mention.  In
Gonzales, the Court made clear that harm prevention — specifically,
preventing harm to women — was a constitutionally valid justification for
restricting the abortion right. Gonzales’s harm-prevention rationale was the
product of anti-abortion advocacy’s (ultimately successful) use of a woman-
protective argument.108  That argument, which abortion opponents have de-
veloped over the past decade, “portrays both the fetus and the woman as
victims of abortion providers and the pro-choice movement.”109  Presuma-
bly, opponents advanced that argument, which the Gonzales Court em-
braced, because they were concerned about the extent to which abortion
harms women.  The study just described, however, suggests that harm might
not have been the principal driver of abortion opponents who advanced the
woman-protective theory in abortion litigation.  In this sense, Gonzales’s wo-
man-protective rationale not only rests on questionable science, as its critics
have charged,110 but might also derive from questionable motives.
Again, to be clear, none of the studies described here establishes a
causal relationship between disgust and abortion opposition.  Thus, we can-
not rely on them to say definitively that the emotion of disgust (divorced
from harm concerns) drives abortion opposition and restrictive abortion
laws.  However, the studies do significantly contribute to an established (and
still growing) body of experimental work in this area that has demonstrated
107 Koleva et al., supra note 99, at 188.  According to the authors of this study, purity/
disgust’s role in driving political ideology more generally is an under-explored, and therefore
under-theorized, topic in political science. See id. at 188 (“Purity-related concerns, which are
largely missing from existing psychological models of political attitudes, should be included in
future theorizing and research on the psychological underpinnings of ideology.”).  As to the
relationship among harm, disgust, and abortion opposition, it could be that abortion opponents
initially oppose abortion for reasons not relating to harm — indeed, for reasons relating to
disgust, as explained in greater length below — but justify that opposition by adverting to
harm.  The use of harm — particularly, though not exclusively, by political and social conserv-
atives — as a post-hoc justification for moral judgments precipitated by disgust has been
widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Roberto Gutierrez & Roger Giner-Sorolla, Anger, Disgust,
and Presumption of Harm as Reactions to Taboo-Breaking Behaviors, 7 EMOTION 853, 866
(2007) (remarking that “violations of sexual morality elicit presumptions of harm primarily
among political conservatives”); Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 625 (1993) (stating that in
all cultures “harm references may sometimes be red herrings”); Dan Kahan, The Cognitively
Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 101, 106 (2007) (observing that liberals and conservatives
alike “are much more likely to take note of and assign significance to instances of harm
associated with behavior we despise than those associated with conduct we revere”).  Haidt
has developed a “social intuitionist model” to explain post-hoc reasoning of this sort. See
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 817–19 (2001).
108 See Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights, supra note 3, at 837 (dis-
cussing the woman-protective justification in restrictive abortion legislation).
109 Franklin, supra note 14, at 158–59.
110 See Guthrie, supra note 8, passim.
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(1) an extremely strong correlation between disgust sensitivity and negative
attitudes toward purity violations like (and including) abortion, (2) the pre-
dictive value of disgust sensitivity in the abortion context, and (3) the lack of
a relationship between disgust concerns and harm concerns in moral judg-
ment generally and in abortion opposition specifically.
For this reason, this Article makes a more modest and disciplined claim,
namely, that disgust likely animates abortion opposition and its resultant le-
gal regimes.  It also argues, though, that the mere possibility that disgust
divorced from harm is associated with abortion lawmaking — something
that the studies at a minimum show — is reason enough to care about what
disgust is doing there and what that disgust might mean, particularly now
that disgust is a constitutionally valid basis for abortion regulation.  Erring
on the side of caution, this Article takes the position that recent empirical
work on the abortion-disgust relationship ought to prompt deeper inquiry
into what that relationship is all about.
C. Disgust Is Troubling (as a Normative Matter) in the Abortion Law
Context, but Why?
Scholars have offered a number of reasons why we ought to remain
wary of disgust’s role in the law generally and in the abortion context specif-
ically.  One reason is that disgust is too subjective an emotion to be a stable
and reliable basis for lawmaking.111  Another is that disgust could lead to
“irrational fear mongering”112 and “seems likely to inflame public sentiment
over the issue of abortion — to diminish whatever spirit of moderation re-
mains in America regarding that question.”113  And still another is that dis-
gust flows from feeling, not from logic, thereby “mak[ing] it far easier to
assert that we should ban something simply because it feels wrong.”114  As
such, disgust lacks “analytic transparency,” undermining “much of what is
central to a functional democracy — the public availability of justifications
and reasoning with respect to the resolution of constitutional matters.”115
Scholars have missed another reason — perhaps the best reason — why
we ought to reject disgust as a valid basis for abortion lawmaking: because
disgust signals that gender stereotyping is afoot in abortion regulation, and
gender stereotyping violates constitutional law’s anti-stereotyping principle.
This Article argues that disgust is problematic in the abortion context not
111 See Suter, supra note 5, at 1584 (stating that disgust “raises the problems of moral
relativism of several types: cultural, personal, and temporal”).  Suter goes on to note, “[w]hat
is repugnant to one culture may not be repugnant to another.  What is repugnant to me may not
be repugnant to you.  And what is repugnant today may not be repugnant tomorrow.  Whose
repugnance, then, should drive our policymaking or our determination of constitutional
rights?” Id.
112 Id. at 1583.
113 Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 1022 (2008).
114 Suter, supra note 5, at 1584–86.
115 Id.
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just because of what the emotion of disgust might generally betoken —
moral relativism, fear mongering, and analytic opacity; it is also problematic
because of what disgust for abortion specifically means.  Moral psychology
studies show that “disgust correlates with negative attitudes toward putative
purity violations,”116 like abortion.  Thus, at the very least, they suggest that
disgust likely animates abortion opposition and its resultant laws.  They also
suggest that disgust for abortion is motivated by something other than harm.
But they do not tell us what that “something” is.  For this, we must look
elsewhere — specifically, to theories of disgust from other social science
disciplines, including anthropology and sociology.
As the following Parts show, those two disciplines do not simply estab-
lish a relationship between abortion and disgust, they help explain it.  View-
ing abortion disgust through the theoretical lenses of these disciplines
reveals that, far from lacking transparency, disgust’s operation in abortion
law tells us quite a bit, and all of it troubling from a constitutional sex equal-
ity perspective.
II. ABORTION DISGUST: A GENEALOGY
The question of what drives abortion disgust is an important one now
that we know that disgust not only can play, but also very likely does play
and will continue to play a role in abortion law.  To answer it, this Part
applies the insights of disgust theory to abortion.  Section A explains what,
in general, disgusts, focusing mainly on the social role theory of disgust for
reasons discussed below.  Section B then applies the social role theory of
disgust to abortion disgust specifically; in so doing, it suggests that abortion
provokes disgust because it is thought by some to disrupt gender norms.  The
genealogy of abortion disgust that this Part uncovers provides the best rea-
son why we ought to be wary of disgust’s role in abortion lawmaking, partic-
ularly given that disgust is both a legitimate and a likely basis for it.
A. What Disgusts
Contemporary disgust theorists uniformly argue that “the raison d’eˆtre
for the emotion of disgust” is harm and death avoidance.117  “[D]isgust is
fundamentally about our awareness of our own death and our terror of it,”
one theorist recently observed.118  It “[arises] from our need to protect our-
selves from triggers that remind us of this truth.”119  Such triggers are nu-
116 Horberg et al., supra note 94, at 972.
117 HERZ, supra note 36, at 126; see also Paul Rozin et al., Disgust, in HANDBOOK OF
EMOTIONS 637, 642 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 2000) (stating that “[r]esearch on terror man-
agement theory has shown a strong connection between disgust and fear of death,” and that
“[t]hese speculations about death lead to an overarching description of disgust elicitors:
[a]nything that reminds us that we are animals [and therefore mortal] elicits disgust”).
118 HERZ, supra note 36, at 130.
119 Id.
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merous, moreover, and have evolved over time.120  They now include
noxious substances (such as rotting meat, a “core disgust” elicitor);121 body
envelope violations (such as gore and maiming, two “animal-nature disgust”
elicitors);122 and strangers and their potential contaminants (an “interper-
sonal disgust” elicitor).123
Disgust is more than just a response to death and its myriad elicitors,
however.  It is also a response to non-harmful behaviors that violate social
boundaries and that deviate from cultural norms.  Indeed, moral psycholo-
gists are intrigued by the fact that disgust elicitors now include socially un-
acceptable behavior that is completely harmless.124  As two scholars recently
put it, “[m]oral misdeeds that do not involve any literal threat of contamina-
tion seem to be reliable elicitors of the very same disgust emotion that was
once probably only elicited by contaminants like feces and rotting meat.”125
For psychologists, this idea of “harmless” social disgust is a relatively novel
concept.  In the words of one leading disgust theorist, “[r]esearch on moral-
ity beyond harm . . . is in its infancy.”126
But for one of the world’s foremost anthropologists, disgust is above all
else a response to the transgression of cultural taboos and other socially de-
viant conduct.  The late British anthropologist Mary Douglas famously ex-
pounded a social theory of disgust in her seminal work, Purity and
Danger.127  Douglas’s social theory of disgust has been enormously influen-
tial for legal scholars, who have turned to it to explain countless phenomena,
from environmental pollution to animus against gay people.128  No less influ-
ential than her cultural theory of risk,129  Douglas’s social theory of disgust
has influenced the way in which scholars from a number of disciplines —
including, but certainly not limited to, the law — conceptualize what disgust
is and how it works.
It is no surprise, then, that Professor Martha Nussbaum, among the first
legal scholars to bring the insights of disgust theory to bear on the law,130 has
referred to Douglas’s social disgust theory as one of the two “most famous”
120 See Rozin et al., supra note 117, at 644 (stating that the triggers and elicitors of disgust
have “been transformed and greatly expanded” over time).
121 See id. at 638.
122 Id. at 642.
123 See id. at 643.
124 See, e.g., Haidt & Graham, supra note 84, at 106 (stating that “in most human societies
disgust has become a social emotion”).
125 Yoel Inbar & David Pizzaro, Grime and Punishment: How Disgust Influences Moral,
Social, and Legal Judgments, 21 JURY EXPERT 12, 13 (2009).
126 Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCI. 998, 1001 (2007).
127 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19.
128 See supra notes 23–26.
129 Douglas’s cultural theory of risk has recently spawned innovative work by legal aca-
demics on the relationship between individuals’ cultural worldviews and their perceptions of
risk across a variety of legal domains. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More
Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1291 (2003) (applying Douglas’s cultural theory of risk to attitudes about gun control).
130 Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice,” supra note 9.
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theories of disgust.131  She observes that Douglas’s theory, which sees disgust
as a response to the “violation of socially imposed boundaries,”132 has done
“important work in making us aware of social factors surrounding dis-
gust.”133   More recently, Professor Suzanne Goldberg has reminded us that
“Mary Douglas was the first to analyze systematically the ways in which
human fears of impurity, contagion, and pollution undergird social
taboos.”134
Most important for this Article’s purposes, though, is the fact that
Douglas’s social theory of disgust helps elucidate why people might find
even harmless behavior to be disgusting (the question that moral psycholo-
gists have only just begun to test experimentally), as well as why abortion
might be a source of disgust for some people even apart from harm concerns
(as illustrated by the empirical findings discussed earlier).  Her theory, then,
is not only enormously influential.  It also has an explanatory power that
supplements moral psychology’s intriguing — though incomplete — in-
sights on disgust.
Douglas’s social role theory of disgust begins with the recognition that
nothing is inherently disgusting.  Rather, disgust — or what she calls “dirt”
— is a response to “matter out of place.”135  Resisting the notion of “abso-
lute dirt,” Douglas argues that dirt is an idea rather than a thing.136  “For us
[moderns],” she explains, “dirt is a kind of compendium category for all
events which blur, smudge, contradict, or otherwise confuse accepted classi-
fications.  The underlying feeling is that a system of values which is habitu-
ally expressed in a given arrangement of things has been violated.”137
Douglas’s definition of dirt and “defilement”138 is only loosely con-
nected, if at all, to actual dirt.  Rather, Douglas’s conception of that which
disgusts or “pollutes”139 is broad and capacious, a “compendium cate-
131 NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 9, at 91.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Goldberg, supra note 25, at 1388–89.
135 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 44.
136 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 109.
137 Id.
138 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 30–42 (introducing and discussing
the concept of “secular defilement”).
139 In Purity and Danger, Douglas refers to phenomena that violate cultural norms and
social boundaries — what this Article refers to as disgust elicitors — as forms of “pollution”
that are subject to pollution rituals. Id. at 4 (stating that “pollution ideas relate to social life”
and that “some pollutions are used as analogies for expressing a general view of the social
order”).  While Douglas does not use the word “disgust” in Purity and Danger to describe
these pollution rituals, she does use that term in subsequent works that summarize her theory
first set forth in Purity and Danger.  For instance, in A History of Grid and Group Cultural
Theory, Douglas uses terms like pollution, taboo, defilement, and disgust interchangeably.  She
says:
Not concerned to show that the typical institutions of modern society can be traced
in the most exotic societies, I set out to show [in Purity and Danger] that the fa-
mously primitive concepts of pollution and taboo were with “Us” as much as with
“Them.”  Ritual defilement should be brought under the same rubric as the rituals of
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gory”140 that includes any and all phenomena that “confuse accepted classi-
fications.”141  In support of that expansive definition, Douglas points out that
the idea of dirt is a very old one, older even than our knowledge of bacteriol-
ogy and disease.142  For this reason, she submits, something other than
“pathogenicity and hygiene” motivates pollution reactions.  That something,
in her view, is contradiction.  She says: “If we treat all pollution behaviour
as the reaction to any event likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifi-
cations, we can bring two new approaches to bear on the problem: the work
of psychologists on perception and of anthropologists on the structural anal-
ysis of culture.”143
Unlike most contemporary disgust theorists, then, Douglas posits that at
its core, disgust is not about harm and death but about “anomaly and ambi-
guity,”144 both of which threaten the “social order” and the “cherished clas-
sifications” on which it rests.145  “Dirt avoidance,” she explains, “is a
process of tidying up, ensuring that the order in external physical events
conforms to the structure of ideas.”146  Phenomena that confound that struc-
ture, she remarks, cause “cognitive discomfort”;147 as a result, they are either
spring cleaning and other domiciliary standards of hygiene.  I postulated a universal
cognitive block against matter out of place.  Unclassifiables, I said, provoke cogni-
tive discomfort and reactions of disgust, hence negative attitudes to slime, insects,
and dirt in general.  It was a Durkhemian thesis: classification underwrites all at-
tempts to co-ordinate activities, anything that challenges the habitual classifications
is rejected.
MARY DOUGLAS, A HISTORY OF GRID AND GROUP CULTURAL THEORY 1–2, available at http://
projects.chass.utoronto.ca/semiotics/cyber/douglas1.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter DOUGLAS, GRID AND GROUP CULTURAL THEORY].
140 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 109.
141 Id.
142 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 44 (observing that “[t]he bacterial
transmission of disease was a great nineteenth-century discovery,” but that “our ideas of dirt
are not so recent”); id. (arguing that “[w]e must be able to make the effort to think back
beyond the last 150 years and to analyse the bases of dirt-avoidance, before it was transformed
by bacteriology”); id. (insisting that we “abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion
of dirt”).
143 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 109; see also DOUGLAS, PURITY AND
DANGER, supra note 19, at 45.
144 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 47.
145 Id. at 45.
146 DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS, supra note 19, at 111.
147 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at xi (observing the “cognitive dis-
comfort caused by ambiguity”).  Douglas’s understanding of the “cognitive discomfort”
caused by ambiguous and anomalous phenomena is closely related to social psychology’s the-
ory of cognitive dissonance, to which Douglas herself adverts in Purity and Danger. See id. at
49.  According to that theory, individuals confronted with a reality that deviates from their
own belief system feel cognitive dissonance.  Uncomfortable with such dissonance, they try to
reduce it by engaging in different management strategies, one of which is to reject the deviant
element entirely.  The theory of cognitive dissonance was first developed by Leon Festinger in
1957. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE v–viii (1957).  As Douglas
puts it: “Following the work of Festinger it is obvious that a person, when he finds his own
convictions at variance with those of friends, either wavers or tries to convince the friends of
their error.” DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 49.
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placed “into the category of the sacred” or cast out as an “abomination.”148
In sum, according to Douglas’s structural scheme, “[s]ocial and cognitive
structures create dirt less by assigning something to play that role than as a
consequence of categorization itself.”149
Douglas has used her social role theory of disgust to explain why cer-
tain phenomena are considered impure and polluting.  In Purity and Danger,
for instance, she uses that theory to explain the abominations and dietary
rules of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, the third and fifth books, respectively,
of the Torah.  There, the frog is considered clean, whereas the mouse is
not.150  There, the camel, “because it chews the cud but does not part the
hoof, is unclean,” as is the swine, which “parts the hoof . . . but does not
chew the cud.”151  There, “[a]ll winged insects that go upon all fours are an
abomination,” whereas those that “go on all fours . . . [and] which have
legs above their feet, with which to leap upon the earth,” are not.152  And
there, water-creatures with fins and scales are clean, whereas “[e]verything
. . . that has not fins and scales is an abomination to you.”153
Douglas notes that these rules have confounded a venerated line of Bib-
lical scholars, with the medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides character-
izing many of them as “devoid of sense,” and others arguing that they “are
not by any means to be rationalised.”154  In Douglas’s view, the rules do
make sense, but not because they reflect a concern with “hygiene . . . and
instinctive revulsion.”155  Rather, she argues, the Old Testament’s injunctions
are best understood as an anxiety about things and individuals that do not
“conform to the class to which they belong.”156  She says: “[T]he underly-
ing principle of cleanness in animals is that they shall conform fully to their
class.  Those species are unclean which are imperfect members of their class,
or whose class itself confounds the general scheme of the world.”157
The Old Testament’s taboos are primarily a vehicle, albeit a powerful
one, through which Douglas transmits her larger theory about all taboos.
According to that theory, taboo and disgust are less about physical impurity,
harm, and death (if they are about those things at all), and more about soci-
ety’s collective reaction against nonconformity.  “Taboo protects the local
consensus on how the world is organised,” Douglas wrote before her death
148 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 49.
149 MILLER, supra note 9, at 44.
150 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 53.
151 Id. at 52.
152 Id. at 53.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 54.
155 Id. at 62.
156 Id. at 69.
157 Id.
 2013] Abortion and Disgust 435
in 2007.158  If that is true, then it follows that anything that challenges that
organization becomes an object of disgust.159
Some scholars have criticized Douglas’s structural theory of disgust for
being overly reductive.  “The risk to [her] kind of structuralism,” Professor
William Miller writes, “is that it ends in reduction and tautology.”160  Many
grand theories, though, are reductive and tautological, including the theory
that disgust is principally about death and our fear of it.  If fear-of-death
were disgust’s essence, then why are relatively harmless worms disgusting
but potentially quite harmful bears and lions not?  Moreover, theorizing dis-
gust can be especially difficult in light of disgust’s broad range of elicitors,
and Douglas’s theory has an explanatory power that helps to make sense of
many of them, from incest, gay marriage, environmental pollution, and por-
nography, as legal scholars have already shown,161 to abortion, as Section B
now demonstrates.  Her theory helps make “us aware” not only of the “so-
cial factors surrounding disgust,”162 as Nussbaum has argued, but also, and
more specifically, of the social factors surrounding disgust for abortion.
B. Why Abortion Disgusts
This section considers why abortion specifically is a source of disgust.
Section II.B.1 first addresses (and dispenses with) the argument that abortion
provokes disgust because it involves harm/death.  Section II.B.2 then argues
that a better explanation for abortion disgust may be found in Douglas’s role
violation theory of disgust.
1. Abortion Disgust and Harm/Death.
If “[d]isgust is fundamentally about our awareness of our own death
and our terror of it,”163 then disgust for abortion makes sense as a descriptive
matter because for many people, it is a reaction to harm/death.  Moreover, if
disgust for abortion is a reaction to harm/death, then abortion disgust is mor-
ally and legally defensible because it is tied to harm, and harm prevention is
widely considered to be a valid basis for regulating conduct in a liberal dem-
ocratic order.  Indeed, according to the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,
harm prevention is the only constitutional basis for regulating conduct.164
158 Id. at xi.
159 See HERZ, supra note 36, at 188 (arguing that disgust “is inherently about mess and
disorder”).
160 MILLER, supra note 9, at 44; see also NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note
9, at 91 (arguing, inter alia, that Douglas’s “idea of anomaly is too weak to explain why we
find some things disgusting,” and that Paul Rozin’s theory of disgust, which is the “most
famous theoretical alternative,” “seems clearly preferable to Douglas’s theory”).
161 See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
162 NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 9, at 91.
163 HERZ, supra note 36, at 130.
164 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (distinguishing between state regula-
tion of harmful and non-harmful conduct).  Further, the Court maintains that the state may not
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Explaining abortion disgust as a reaction to harm/death is tempting,
particularly given the close associations between disgust and death.  Never-
theless, there are a number of arguments that harm/death concerns are not
the principal motivators for abortion disgust, abortion opposition, and re-
strictive abortion laws.  Consider here four of them.
First, as discussed earlier, empirical research in moral psychology sug-
gests that harm is a notably insignificant predictor for abortion opposition.165
Recall that psychologists have recently found that people whose morality
rests primarily on the purity moral foundation, which “is based on the emo-
tion of disgust,”166 overwhelmingly disapproved of abortion, whereas people
whose morality rests primarily on the other foundations, including the harm
foundation, did not.  In fact, of all the moral foundations tested, the purity/
disgust foundation “was the best foundation predictor of endorsing stricter
abortion laws.”167  The authors of that study remarked that this finding was
noteworthy given that the “political rhetoric about the morality of abortion”
is so often “dominated by arguments about (potential) harm.”168
Numerous other studies have found that harm matters less and that dis-
gust matters more as a moral foundation for self-identified conservatives,169
the group more likely to oppose abortion.170  Indeed, self-identified conserv-
atives are significantly more likely than their liberal counterparts to say that
disgust alone is a sufficient reason to prohibit certain conduct, especially if
that conduct is sexual in nature and even if that conduct is completely harm-
less.171  Collectively considered, this research casts doubt on the claim that
disgust for abortion is simply a response to abortion’s presumed
harmfulness.
Second, while abortion, like the death penalty and the war in Iraq, is
thought to involve harm/death, studies indicate that something other than
harm/death concerns — or, at the very least, something in addition to harm/
death concerns — is fueling opposition to it.  For instance, a comparison of
views on abortion and the death penalty reveals that most people in the
United States are either pro-life and pro–death penalty or pro-choice and
pro–death penalty.  The smallest average percentage includes those who are
pro-life and anti–death penalty and those who are pro-choice and anti–death
reach non-harmful conduct but may reach harmful conduct, which includes conduct involving
“minors[,] . . . persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused[,] . . . public conduct[, and] prostitution.” Id.
165 See supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
166 Koleva et al., supra note 99, at 185.
167 Id. at 189.
168 Id. at 188.
169 See supra notes 85–102 and accompanying text.
170 See Lydia Saad, “Pro-Choice” Americans at Record Low — 41%, GALLUP (May 23,
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154838/Pro-Choice-Americans-Record-Low.aspx (summa-
rizing a 2012 Gallup poll, which found, among other things, that “the percentage of Republi-
cans identifying as pro-life increas[ed] to 72% from 68% [since] last May, and those
identifying as pro-choice dropp[ed] to 22% from 28%”).
171 See, e.g., Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted, supra note 84, at 721.
 2013] Abortion and Disgust 437
penalty.172  If concerns about death were the primary motivator of abortion
opponents, one would expect somewhat greater overlap between pro-life
views and anti–death penalty views than the numbers suggest.  Of course,
we might attribute the relatively small overlap between these two categories
to the perception of “who” is being “put to death” in each: someone pre-
sumed innocent (in the case of abortion) versus someone presumed (and
proven) guilty (in the case of the death penalty).  Viewed in this light, dis-
gust might be the response to the death of those presumed innocent but not
to the death of those presumed guilty.
But consider in this regard a recent publication from the Pew Research
Center (“PRC”) indicating that as of 2011, 72% of Republicans supported
the use of force in Iraq (presumably notwithstanding evidence of that inva-
sion’s considerable civilian death toll).173  That same year, Gallup reported
that 68% of Republicans identified as “pro-life” on the abortion issue.174
These statistics suggest that it is not the death of innocent life that is the core
source of abortion opposition but rather the death of innocent life that takes
place in a certain context and under certain conditions.  At the very least,
they suggest that the lack of a significant overlap between abortion opposi-
tion and death penalty opposition is not necessarily, or not only, due to the
fact that “innocent” life is implicated in one and “guilty” life in the other.
“While a deep concern for sacred human life may be the most acceptable
and humanitarian justification for opposing abortion,” one scholar writes,
“there is considerable empirical evidence casting doubt on this justifica-
tion.”175  Indeed, “the notion that opposition to abortion represents a more
generalized pro-life orientation [has] received no support” in the empirical
literature dealing with the subject.176
Moreover, even assuming there was significant overlap among abortion
opposition, death penalty opposition, and war opposition, studies suggest
that opposition to those issues likely comes from different sources.  Abortion
opposition correlates with disgust.  Opposition to other harm/death-related
issues, however, does not.  For instance, one study found that opposition to
172 See KIMBERLY COOK, DIVIDED PASSIONS: PUBLIC OPINIONS ON ABORTION AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 67 (1998) (showing that over a seventeen-year period (1977–1994) an aver-
age of 33% of Americans identified as pro-life and pro–death penalty, 45% as pro-choice and
pro–death penalty, 10% as pro-life and anti–death penalty, and 10% as pro-choice and
anti–death penalty); see also Kimberly J. Cook, A Passion to Punish: Abortion Opponents
Who Favor the Death Penalty, 15 JUST. Q. 329 (1998) (discussing the possible reasons for the
pro-life/pro–death penalty position).
173 Iraq and Public Opinion: The Troops Come Home, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 14,
2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2145/iraq-backgrounder-the-troops-come-home (finding
that as of 2011, “72% of Republicans support the decision to use force [in Iraq] compared
with just 44% of independents and 37% of Democrats”).
174 Lydia Saad, Republicans More Unified than Democrats on Abortion, GALLUP (June 6,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147941/republicans-unified-democrats-abortion.aspx.
175 COOK, supra note 172, at 57.
176 Donald Granberg, Pro-Life or Reflection of Conservative Ideology? An Analysis of
Opposition to Legalized Abortion, 62 SOC. & SOC. RES. 414, 475 (1978).
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the death penalty, to the war in Iraq, and to bombing Iran correlated weakly
with disgust sensitivity (and, in the case of the death penalty, quite
weakly).177  It determined that whereas disgust sensitivity significantly pre-
dicted moral disapproval of abortion, it did not significantly predict opposi-
tion to those three other issues.  Another study found that the disgust/purity
moral foundation correlated negatively with moral disapproval for the death
penalty, meaning that the more disgust-sensitive an individual was, the more
likely she was to support the death penalty.178  In addition, it found that of all
the variables tested — age, gender, religion, harm concerns, disgust con-
cerns — harm, not disgust, was the most significant predictor of moral dis-
approval for the death penalty.179
Even assuming, then, a situation where everyone who opposed abortion
also opposed the death penalty and the war in Iraq, the studies still suggest
that abortion opposition comes from a very different place than opposition to
those other harm/death-related issues.
Third, even those abortion regulations that seem to be most concerned
about harm bear but a remote relationship to harm prevention, leading one to
wonder what motivates most abortion regulation.  For instance, the fetal pain
laws discussed earlier capture just 1% of all abortions performed in the
United States annually.180  Such “figures suggest that the legislation’s very
slight, practical impact on abortion procedures within [a] state could not by
itself have justified the legislation’s passage.”181  According to Professor
Amanda Pustilnik, the real motivation for such laws is “repugnance to abor-
tion — not the issue of fetal pain itself.”182  Similarly, the abortion proce-
dure at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart — so-called “partial birth,” or D&X,
abortion — was exceedingly rare even before it was outlawed in 2003.  In
2000, for instance, D&X abortions accounted for just 0.2% of all abortions
performed that year.183  Thus, likely for these reasons, Judge Richard Posner
has commented that the entire D&X controversy was “[w]hipped up by
activists who wanted to dramatize the ugliness of abortions” generally.184
If Professor Pustilnik and Judge Posner are right, then fetal pain and
D&X legislation raise the strong possibility that something other than a con-
cern about harm prevention is motivating abortion opposition and its attend-
ant regulation.  Indeed, if harm is not the principal motivator for abortion
laws that address issues that on their surface seem so directly linked to harm
(fetal pain, D&X), then what does this say about harm’s role in abortion laws
177 See Inbar et al., More Easily Disgusted, supra note 84, at 721 tbl.1.
178 See Koleva et al., supra note 99, at 187 tbl.2.
179 See id. at 188 tbl.3.
180 Pustilnik, supra note 79, at 843.
181 Id. at 844.
182 Id. at 843.
183 See Rovner, supra note 43.
184 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting),
vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
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that address issues whose relationship to harm are considerably more
attenuated?185
Fourth, the vast majority of Americans — Democrats, Independents,
and Republicans alike — support abortion in cases where the pregnancy was
the result of rape or incest.  For instance, according to a CNN poll conducted
in August 2012, 90% of Democrats, 81% of Independents, and 76% of
Republicans responded that abortion should be “legal” when “the preg-
nancy was caused by rape or incest.”186  Given that a 2012 Gallup poll found
that 72% of Republicans identified as “pro-life,”187 one can assume that for
many Republicans, being “pro-life” means supporting abortion at least some
of the time, depending on the conditions under which the pregnancy oc-
curred.  The point here is that if concerns about harm prevention were abor-
tion opponents’ primary concern, then one would not expect so many
opponents to forgo such concerns in particular contexts, like rape and incest.
The fact that they often do suggests that harm prevention is not their princi-
pal motivation for opposing abortion.188
2. Abortion Disgust and Social Role Violation.
If abortion disgust is not principally a reaction to harm/death, then what
is it a reaction to?  This subsection’s central argument is this: for many peo-
ple, abortion provokes disgust not because of harm but because it represents
women engaging in gender-atypical behavior.
Douglas theorized that at their core, reactions of disgust are reactions
against “anomaly.”  Anomalous things are things that do not “conform to
the class to which they belong”189 or that constitute “imperfect members of
their class”190 because they do not act like typical class members.  For Doug-
las, nothing is inherently dirty (or disgusting) and nothing is instinctively
repulsive. Rather, disgust and repulsion are contextual and relative; they are
185 Such laws include targeted regulations of abortion providers (“TRAP laws”).  While
TRAP laws vary by state, “in general they impose licensing requirements, authorize state
inspections, regulate wide-ranging aspects of abortion providers’ operations — including, for
example, staff qualifications and minimum hallway dimensions — and impose civil and crimi-
nal penalties for noncompliance.”  Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative
Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865, 871 (2007).
186 See Abortion and Birth Control, POLLING REP., http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.
htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
187 Saad, supra note 170 (reporting this figure).
188 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Judgment of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID 31, 49 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (arguing that rape exemptions suggest “that the state’s
interest in the fetus is strongly connected to beliefs about maternal responsibility — that wo-
men who are victims of statutory or forceable rape are not responsible for engaging in sexual
intercourse that led to their pregnancy”); Reva B. Siegel, Concurring Opinion, in WHAT ROE
V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 63, 77 (arguing that the “statutory exemption allowing
women to have abortions if they conceive by rape indicates that the state’s decision to prohibit
abortion rests on unarticulated assumptions about how women are to comport themselves sex-
ually — a code the state enforces by selectively allowing women access to abortion”).
189 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 67.
190 Id. at 69.
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reactions to behaviors and individuals that violate cultural norms and social
roles, and thereby challenge “how the world is organised.”191 As another
prominent social scientist has written, “[t]he pure will be that which con-
forms to an established taxonomy; the impure, that which unsettles it.”192
We like the world to be “tidy” and organized, Douglas insists,193 and when
anything “confus[es] accepted classifications”194 and “contradict[s] cher-
ished classifications”195 it “provoke[s] cognitive discomfort and reactions
of disgust.”196
The idea that women, and especially pregnant women,197 would re-
nounce motherhood elicits disgust because that renunciation exemplifies wo-
men’s failure to conform to the “class to which they belong.”198  “[N]o
woman achieves her full position in society until she gives birth to a child,”
Professor Dorothy Roberts writes.199  “Being a mother is women’s major so-
cial role.”200  As the Supreme Court observed in its most recent constitu-
tional sex equality case, the “prevailing ideology about women’s roles” in
American history is “that women are mothers first.”201  Indeed, traditionally
speaking, women’s “contributions to the nation were defined principally in
relation to . . . motherhood.”202
If becoming a mother is “women’s major social role,” then it follows
that choosing not to become one, particularly when given the opportunity to
do so, constitutes an anomaly; according to Douglas’s role-violation theory,
such conduct is an abomination.  Like the water-creature without fins or
scales, the pregnant woman who rejects the motherhood that society
presumes she inhabits by virtue of being pregnant is deeply unsettling.203
191 Id. at xi.
192 JULIA KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 98 (Leon S. Roudiez
trans., 1982).
193 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 5.
194 Id. at 45.
195 Id.
196 DOUGLAS, GRID AND GROUP CULTURAL THEORY, supra note 139, at 1.
197 Abortion is an object of stigma and disgust in a way that other reproductive decisions,
including the decision to forgo having children or to use contraception, are not. See Kumar et
al., supra note 29, at 627 (stating that “[u]nlike other behaviours that confound expectations
of women as mothers (e.g., choosing to remain childless or using contraceptives), a woman
who terminates a pregnancy often defies long-held ideals of subordination to community
needs”).  As of 2012, an overwhelming majority of Americans — 89% — believes that con-
traception is “morally acceptable.”  Frank Newport, Americans, Including Catholics, Say Con-
traception is Morally OK, GALLUP (May 22, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154799/
americans-including-catholics-say-birth-control-morally.aspx.  By contrast, as of 2012, a ma-
jority of Americans morally disapproves of abortion. See Saad, supra note 170.
198 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 67.
199 Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 96 (1993).
200 Id.
201 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
202 Franklin, supra note 14, at 155.
203 In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion repeatedly collapses preg-
nancy into motherhood in a way that suggests that merely being pregnant makes one a mother.
See 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  Indeed, according to the majority, motherhood continues even after
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Her behavior causes “cognitive discomfort,”204 if not extreme cognitive dis-
sonance, because it “confounds the general scheme of the world.”205
The role violation theory of abortion disgust offered here finds strong
support in at least three different sources: recent sociological analyses of
abortion stigma; historical accounts of abortion regulation; and Gonzales v.
Carhart itself.  Each demonstrates that abortion provokes discomfort, oppo-
sition, and disgust principally because it represents women acting contrary to
deeply rooted cultural conceptions of womanhood and motherhood.
First, consider the relationship between gender nonconformity and
“abortion stigma.”206  As sociologist Erving Goffman well understood,
stigma both reflects and reproduces disgust; the two, he observed, exist in a
feedback loop.207  An examination of “abortion stigma” is therefore simulta-
neously an examination of abortion disgust.
Sociologists have argued that “abortion stigma — rather than a univer-
sal truth — is a social phenomenon that is constructed and reproduced lo-
cally through various pathways.”208  In many cultures,
a woman who seeks an abortion is inadvertently challenging
widely-held assumptions about the “essential nature” of women
. . . . To choose to avert a specific birth, counters prevailing views
of women as perpetual life givers and asserts women’s moral au-
tonomy in a way that can be deeply threatening.  Women, who
seek induced abortions . . . may be perceived as challenging the
inescapability of maternity and defying reproductive physiology.209
an abortion. See id. at 159 (describing “a mother who comes to regret her choice” to termi-
nate a pregnancy).
204 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at xi.
205 Id. at 69.  It is worth noting that the woman who terminates a pregnancy is an anomaly
for two interrelated reasons.  Douglas explains that anomalous phenomena are phenomena that
do “not fit a given set or series,” that is, phenomena that do not conform to their class. Id. at
47.  But anomalous phenomena can also be phenomena that partake of two categories simulta-
neously. See id.  The best example of this latter sense of anomaly is the penguin, which
“flies” underwater; as such, the penguin is simultaneously like a bird and like a fish.  Women
who have abortions are anomalous in both of these ways.  First, they are anomalous because
they do not act the way in which most women, and all pregnant women, presumptively act; as
such, they are imperfect members of their class.  Second, they are anomalous because their
refusal to become mothers makes them seem like persons who partake of two categories,
female and male.  While biologically female, such women are nevertheless acting like men by
deviating from “women’s major social role” of having children.
206 Kumar et al., supra note 29, at 626; see also Anu Kumar & Leila Hessini, Legislating
Abortion Stigma, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/anu-kumar/legislating-abortion-stig_b_825275.html (discussing the myriad ways in
which the law has recently “institutionalized” abortion stigma, including the enactment of
mandatory ultrasound laws).
207 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3
(1963) (noting that stigma is an “attribute that is deeply discrediting,” one which spoils or
taints one’s identity); see also Richard J. Arneson, Shame, Stigma, and Disgust in the Decent
Society, 11 J. ETHICS 31 (2007) (discussing this relationship).
208 Kumar et al., supra note 29, at 628.
209 Id.
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In other words, “[t]he power dynamics that underline abortion [stigma] are
part of an ideological struggle about the meaning of family, motherhood and
sexuality.”210  As one study on abortion stigma put it, “[a]bortion . . . is
stigmatized because it is evidence that a woman has had ‘nonprocreative’ sex
and is seeking to exert control over her own reproduction and sexuality, both
of which threaten existing gender norms.”211  Or, as Professor Jack Balkin
has recently argued, “[s]ociety places shame and stigma on women” who
give up their children through abortion “because they failed at the social role
of caring for their children, which is the social meaning of motherhood.”212
Viewed in this light, abortion stigma and its related disgust are less
about the shame associated with killing another human being than they are
about the shame associated with conduct that defies deeply rooted beliefs
about women’s social and biological roles.  According to Professor Cass
Sunstein, even to equate abortion with a killing — and therefore to locate
abortion stigma in abortion’s relationship to murder — is to engage in sex
stereotyping.  “Abortion is viewed as a killing, rather than a failure to as-
sist,” he writes, “largely because of constitutionally unacceptable stereo-
types about women’s natural or appropriate role.”213  How else, he asks, can
we explain the different social and legal responses to abortion and a “mere
refusal to protect”?214  Whereas parents are neither expected nor “compelled
to devote their bodies to the protection of children,” he argues, pregnant
women are expected and compelled (after a certain point in the pregnancy)
to do just that.215
Second, consider the link made by some historians between abortion
opposition in the United States and gender role disruption.  Most notable in
this regard is Professor Kristin Luker, who undertook an influential empiri-
cal study of abortion regulation in California over a twenty-year period,
from the 1960s to the 1980s.216  Professor Luker found that abortion’s per-
ceived immorality is a relatively novel concept, and that the principal reason
for it is the idea that abortion conflicts with “the traditional belief that wo-
men should be wives and mothers first.” 217  She notes that nineteenth-cen-
tury women did not consider abortion, and particularly early abortion, “to be
210 Id.
211 Alison Norris et al., Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes,
and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S49, S51 (2011).
212 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 323–24
(2007).  On restrictive abortion laws as expressive shaming techniques, see Caitlin E. Borg-
mann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 291 n.2 (2010) (arguing that “a process of shaming, or
moral condemnation, is imposed upon abortion patients by the public, through federal and
state abortion laws”).
213 Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornog-
raphy, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1992).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 34.
216 KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 1 (1984).
217 Id. at 161.
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morally wrong.”218  Moreover, for the first sixty years of the twentieth cen-
tury, abortion was taboo not because it was considered to be tantamount to
infanticide, but rather because it was tied to sex, and particularly to non-
procreative sex.  “[F]or many people,” Luker explains, “abortion was ‘un-
speakable’ not because it represented the death of a child but because it rep-
resented ‘getting caught’ in the consequences of sexuality.  Sex, not abortion,
was what people didn’t talk about.”219
Most significant here are Luker’s findings with respect to the modern
abortion debate, which for the purposes of her study extended into the mid-
1980s.  Luker found that that debate “is so passionate and hard-fought be-
cause it is a referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood.” 220  She
writes:
The abortion debate has become a debate among women . . . .
How the issue is framed, how people think about it, and, most
importantly, where the passions come from are all related to the
fact that the battlelines are increasingly drawn (and defended) by
women.  While on the surface it is the embryo’s fate that seems to
be at stake, the abortion debate is actually about the meanings of
women’s lives.221
Luker shows that pro-choice activists believe that “men and women are
substantially equal” and “see women’s reproductive and family roles not as
a ‘natural’ niche but as potential barriers to full equality.”222  Pro-life activ-
ists, by contrast, “believe that men and women are inherently different and
therefore have different ‘natural’ roles in life.”223  As she describes the latter
group:
[A]bortion is wrong [for pro-life activists] because it fosters and
supports a world view that deemphasizes (and therefore down-
grades) the traditional roles of men and women.  Because these
roles have been satisfying ones for pro-life people and because
they believe this emotional and social division of labor is both
“appropriate and natural,” the act of abortion is wrong because it
plays havoc with this arrangement of the world.224
218 Id. at 21.
219 Id. at 129.  It is important to note, however, that while nineteenth-century women
might not have considered abortion to be morally wrong, the nineteenth-century doctors who
pushed for legislation criminalizing contraception and abortion did.  As Professor Reva Siegel
has shown, those doctors advocated for criminal abortion laws by adverting to arguments
about women’s proper roles as mothers. See Siegel, supra note 188, at 63, 75.
220 LUKER, supra note 216, at 193.
221 Id. at 193–94.
222 Id. at 176.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 162.
 444 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 48
Luker’s empirical findings with respect to the modern pro-life move-
ment dovetail with Mary Douglas’s structuralist theory of pollution and dis-
gust.  Douglas theorized that things and actions are labeled impure and
polluting when they “confound[] the general scheme of the world”225 and
thereby challenge the way in which “the world is organised.”226  In this
sense, Luker found to be true (at least for abortion) what Douglas had theo-
rized, namely, that extreme “cognitive discomfort” results from something
(or from someone) that challenges a deeply rooted “worldview.”
Third and last, consider Gonzales v. Carhart, the case that established
disgust as a legitimate basis for abortion regulation, and in which disgust and
gender role concerns are mutually reinforcing.  Recall that the Gonzales
Court upheld the federal D&X ban on the bases of disgust and maternal
regret, the latter of which rests on two assumptions.  The first assumption is
that pregnant women are not only mothers but also naturally maternal.  In
the Court’s words, the “bond of love the mother has for her child” represents
the “ultimate expression” of “[r]espect for human life.”227  The second as-
sumption is that given the strong mother/child bond, a woman who under-
goes a D&X abortion might “come to regret [her] choice to abort the infant
life [she] once created and sustained.”228  “It is self-evident,” the majority
asserts, “that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only
after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a
child assuming the human form.”229
The Gonzales majority’s excursus on maternal love and regret has baf-
fled scholars, some of whom have described it as “jarring” and “inexplica-
ble.”230  As one commentator put it, Justice Kennedy’s “lapse” into a reverie
on maternal love constitutes “an unconnected and completely unsubstanti-
ated reflection about motherhood.”231
How might we explain the majority opinion’s “jarring” juxtaposition of
disgust-driven imagery and rhetoric (i.e., its graphic abortion descriptions)
and its “slightly maudlin, highly disputable, yet effectively vapid statement
[about maternal love] that is the springboard for the Court’s elaboration of
its ontology of life, motherhood, and abortion”?232
225 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 69.
226 Id. at xi.
227 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
228 Id. at 159.
229 Id. at 159–60.
230 Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard,
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 929 (2010).
231 Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to Choose,
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 383 (2008).
232 Bridges, supra note 230, at 929 (footnote omitted).
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One explanation is that the Court was aware that in 2007 disgust alone
was an insufficient constitutional basis to justify governmental action.233
Under this view, the Gonzales majority’s principal motivator is disgust, and
maternal regret is merely a cover for that disgust.
An alternative explanation suggests that disgust is important in Gonza-
les only to the extent that the perceived disgustingness of D&X abortion
exacerbates, or even causes, maternal regret.  This explanation sees maternal
regret as the Court’s principal concern in Gonzales and disgust as a subsidi-
ary concern.234
Yet a third explanation for the disgust–maternal regret disjuncture
posits that neither rationale is subordinate to the other; rather, they are mutu-
ally reinforcing.  According to it, D&X abortion is disgusting because it
“perverts” not just birth but also the “bond of love” between mother and
child.235  Under this view, it is not just that D&X’s perceived disgustingness
exacerbates maternal regret.  It is also that D&X is presumed to be disgust-
ing precisely because it so deeply conflicts with the image of maternal love
that the majority projects.  This Article believes that this is the best explana-
tion for the disgust/maternal regret combination in Gonzales because it un-
derstands those two variables as reciprocally related.
Professor Terry Maroney has argued that “[t]he disgusting aspect of
[the D&X] procedure is regarded as noteworthy [in Gonzales] only because
it involves destruction of a semi-developed fetus, and this regard reflects a
moral valuation . . . of the status and worth of that fetus.”236  This Article
would add only that D&X’s disgusting aspect also reflects “a moral valua-
tion” of the pregnant woman, whose actions are especially unsettling given
how closely she “approximates motherhood.”237  The more the fetus looks
like a child, the more the woman looks like a mother,238 and the more the
woman looks like a mother, the more anomalous, contradictory, and discom-
233 When Kennedy dissented in Stenberg v. Carhart in 2000, he did so largely on the basis
of disgust — that is, on the basis of D&X’s allegedly shocking, gruesome, and inhumane
aspects. See 530 U.S. 914, 957–79 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In 2003, however, Ken-
nedy rejected morality, and therefore disgust, as a valid constitutional basis for criminal sod-
omy laws in Lawrence v. Texas. See 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (stating that “the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice” (citation omitted)).  By the time
Kennedy authored Gonzales in 2007, then, he was obviously aware that disgust alone was an
insufficient basis for laws like the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.
234 See, e.g., Suk, supra note 63, at 1235 (arguing that under one view, Kennedy’s disgust-
driven rhetoric was not merely gratuitous but rather shored up the state’s interest “in ensuring
[that] so grave a choice is well informed” (citation omitted)).
235 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007) (describing D&X as a procedure that
“perverts a process during which life is brought into the world” (citation omitted)).
236 Maroney, supra note 11, at 900.
237 Bridges, supra note 230, at 930 (arguing that “[w]ithin the [Gonzales] majority’s
metaphysics, when the object of the procedure approximates a child, the woman approximates
motherhood”).
238 See id.
 446 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 48
fiting — and therefore, according to Douglas, the more repulsive — her
actions become.
When considered in this way, Gonzales’s juxtaposition of disgust and
maternalism is not so “jarring” and “inexplicable” after all.  To the con-
trary, it exemplifies the role violation theory of disgust that this Article sub-
mits is behind much abortion disgust, not just D&X disgust.
III. ABORTION DISGUST AND THE ANTI-STEREOTYPING PRINCIPLE
Part I showed that disgust is both a legitimate and a likely basis for
abortion regulation — not just of D&X regulation, but of all abortion regula-
tion.  Part II then explained what disgust for abortion means.  Part III now
uses the insights of the previous parts to argue that abortion disgust (and the
legal regimes that it underwrites) is problematic from a constitutional sex
equality perspective.  Section A discusses the anti-stereotyping principle of
federal constitutional sex equality law.  Section B argues that abortion dis-
gust and its attendant regulations are in tension with that principle.
A. Constitutional Law’s Anti-Stereotyping Principle
According to the Supreme Court’s most recent sex equality jurispru-
dence, the state commits constitutionally impermissible sex discrimination
when it regulates not just female workers and wives but also “mothers or
mothers-to-be” in a way that reflects and reproduces gender role stereo-
types.239  The Court’s early sex equality jurisprudence rejected as unconstitu-
tional governmental action and reasoning grounded in stereotypes about
women’s and men’s proper roles in employment and in the family.  More
recently, the Court has extended this anti-stereotyping principle beyond
those contexts to other spheres — spheres like reproduction, which were
traditionally regarded to be off-limits as far as the Equal Protection Clause
was concerned because they ostensibly involved “real differences” between
the sexes.
The anti-stereotyping principle has been an indispensable feature of the
Court’s sex equality jurisprudence for almost forty years.  Admittedly, the
Court never mentioned sex stereotypes in its 1971 case Reed v. Reed,240
which marked the first time that the Court struck down a sex-based classifi-
cation as unconstitutional under the Federal Equal Protection Clause.  The
Court did advert, however, to impermissible sex stereotyping and sex “role-
typing”241 in several other cases decided during this same period.
239 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (citation omitted).
240 404 U.S. 71 (1971).  Professor Franklin has characterized the Reed opinion as “spare,
even cryptic” — one which “provided almost no explanation for its groundbreaking holding.”
Franklin, supra note 14, at 125.
241 E.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975).
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For instance, in the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson,242 a plurality of
the Court reasoned that gender classifications warranted heightened judicial
scrutiny under the Constitution in part because of the “gross, stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes” that saturated “our statute books” for
“much of the 19th century.”243  Similarly, in its 1975 case Stanton v. Stan-
ton,244 the Court struck down, on federal equal protection grounds, a state
statute that required parents to support sons until age twenty-one but daugh-
ters until just age eighteen on the ground that the law reflected constitution-
ally impermissible “role-typing.”245  Indeed, by the late 1970s, anti-
stereotyping and anti-role-typing “had become [so] ingrained in the Court’s
own understanding of equal protection”246 that it hardly came as a surprise
when the Court reasoned in 1982 that to satisfy constitutional equality de-
mands statutes “must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females.”247  “Care must be taken,” Justice
O’Connor asserted, “in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself re-
flects archaic and stereotypic notions.”248
While it is certainly true that an anti-stereotyping principle had become
“ingrained” in the Supreme Court’s conception of equal protection by the
late 1970s and early 1980s, it is also true that that principle was limited in
several important respects.  For instance, the Court did not apply the anti-
stereotyping idea to laws that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, rea-
soning in 1974 that pregnancy discrimination did not invariably amount to
unconstitutional sex discrimination in part because pregnancy was unique to
women and therefore reflected a “true” sex difference.249  One year earlier,
in Roe v. Wade,250 the Court established the abortion right under the Four-
teenth Amendment not on equality grounds — as many activists and advo-
cates had hoped251 — but rather on more abstract, and less satisfying, liberty
242 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
243 Id. at 685.
244 421 U.S. 7.
245 Id. at 18.  Four years later, in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the Court ruled uncon-
stitutional a gender-specific state alimony statute that required only husbands to pay alimony
because it “effectively announc[ed] the State’s preference for an allocation of family responsi-
bilities under which the wife plays a dependent role. . . .” Id. at 279.
246 Franklin, supra note 14, at 138.
247 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982).
248 Id. at 725.
249 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).  Professor Siegel interprets
Geduldig as a case that “leaves open the possibility that some legislative classifications con-
cerning pregnancy are sex-based classifications like those considered in Reed and Frontiero.”
Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1891 (2006).
250 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see id. at 164 (finding that the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment protects a fundamental right to privacy that includes abortion).
251 See generally Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engen-
dered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875 (2010) (examining the sex equality claims that animated
feminist abortion rights claims pre–Roe v. Wade); GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 40.
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grounds.252  Several years later, in Michael M. v. Superior Court,253 the Court
upheld a sex-specific statutory rape law against a constitutional equality
challenge because of physiologically “real” differences between males and
females.  Taken together, these cases from the 1970s and 1980s demonstrate
that the Court was unwilling to extend the anti-stereotyping principle to con-
texts involving ostensibly “real” sex differences — contexts, like reproduc-
tion and sexuality, “where sex-role stereotyping was often strongest.”254
Two Supreme Court cases decided in the last two decades have dramati-
cally altered the face of constitutional sex equality doctrine on this issue of
“real” sex difference.  In the first, United States v. Virginia,255 the Court not
only acknowledged real differences between the sexes, but also asserted that
such differences “remain cause for celebration . . . not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportu-
nity.”256  “In the past,” Professor Cary Franklin writes, “‘real’ differences
served as a check on the reach of anti-stereotyping doctrine.”257 Virginia,
however, reverses that trend, making clear that “anti-stereotyping doctrine
serves as a check on the state’s regulation of ‘real’ differences.”258
In the second, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,259 the
Court went even further by extending the anti-stereotyping principle to clas-
sifications that affect “mothers or mothers-to-be.”260 Hibbs upheld the con-
stitutionality of the mandatory leave provision of a federal law, the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).261  The majority there reasoned that the
FMLA was “appropriate,” and therefore constitutional, legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment because it enforced one of its substantive provisions,
namely, the right to equal protection of the laws.  By guaranteeing family
leave — including pregnancy and caretaking leave — to men and women
alike, the Court explained, the FMLA was duly targeting the very role-typ-
ing that amounted to impermissible sex discrimination under the Federal
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.262  Workplace policies that provided
for neither maternity leave nor paternity leave, or that gave maternity leaves
that far exceeded the amount of time needed to recuperate from the physical
252 See Franklin, supra note 14, at 128.  Franklin observes that “Roe treated abortion as a
purely physiological phenomenon, concentrating on female bodies and fetal bodies instead of
inquiring if and when the regulation of pregnant women enforced stereotypes about women’s
family roles and deprived them of the decisional autonomy accorded to men.” Id.
253 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
254 Franklin, supra note 14, at 90.
255 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
256 Id. at 533.
257 Franklin, supra note 14, at 145.
258 Id. at 145–46.
259 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
260 Id. at 736 (citation omitted).
261 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).
262 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728, 736–40.
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act of giving birth,263 reflected the “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring
for family members is women’s work.”264  Insofar as the FMLA’s mandatory
leave provision was intended to counteract such stereotypes — stereotypes
about fathers, as well as about “mothers or mothers-to-be” — it represented
a valid exercise of congressional power.
Hibbs is remarkable for a few reasons.  First, its majority opinion was
authored by then–Chief Justice Rehnquist, who “was an opponent of the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) while serving in the Nixon Justice Depart-
ment,” as well as “a vocal critic of the Court’s sex discrimination jurispru-
dence in his first decade on the Court.”265  Second, it treats all
“classifications concerning pregnancy that reflect sex stereotypes as sex-
based state action.”266  As such, it “situates abortion regulation in a new
constitutional space — one constrained by the anti-stereotyping princi-
ple.”267  That is, if laws limiting access to abortions constitute pregnancy
classifications (which they certainly do), and if abortion laws embody sex
stereotypes (as this Article has argued is the case), then abortion laws are no
less restrained by Hibbs’s anti-stereotyping theory of pregnancy than are
other pregnancy-related laws (such as the employment issue in Hibbs).  To
be sure, there are reasons to remain cautious about Hibbs’s applicability in
the abortion context, including the fact that Hibbs could be read as a case
about the unfairness of regulating “mothers” and “mothers-to-be” in sex-
stereotypical ways rather than as a case about the unfairness of regulating
women who are arguably neither of those identities and who do not want to
be.268  That said, there is but a short step from forcing women to look like a
certain kind of mother (namely, one that does not work, the stereotype that
263 Policies that do not give maternity leave perpetuate the stereotype that pregnant female
employees will not return to work after giving birth, and so do not need leave.  Similarly,
policies that do not give paternity leave perpetuate the stereotype that employee fathers neither
want nor need parental leave.  Finally, maternity leave policies that far exceed the time nor-
mally needed to recuperate from the physical act of giving birth (typically four to eight weeks)
perpetuate the stereotype that employee mothers will be primarily responsible for child-rearing
and not just for child-bearing. See id. at 731.
264 Id.
265 Siegel, supra note 249, at 1872.
266 Id. at 1893; see also Reva B. Siegel & Neil S. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771, 795–96
(2010) (arguing that “after Hibbs it is time to read Geduldig more precisely, as holding that
discrimination against pregnant woman [sic] is not always sex discrimination — but some-
times can be”).
267 Franklin, supra note 14, at 158.
268 Other (related) reasons to remain cautious include the following: First, Hibbs did not
deal with laws that regulated pregnancy (or the pregnant woman) per se, but rather with laws
that regulated pregnancy leave.  Second, Hibbs saw the problem that Congress was rectifying
with the FMLA as one that involved “the faultline between work and family — precisely
where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.” Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
It remains unclear whether the Court would find that restrictive abortion laws implicate a
similar “faultline.”  Third, the Hibbs Court objected to workplace policies that perpetuated
stereotypes about men and women both. Id. at 736.  It is unclear precisely how restrictive
abortion laws perpetuate stereotypes about men.
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Hibbs rejects) to forcing women to become a mother.  In both cases, preg-
nant women are being regulated in ways that reflect and reproduce deeply
rooted cultural “role-types” about womanhood and motherhood, the very
“role-types” that under Hibbs amount to unconstitutional sex
discrimination.
B. Abortion Disgust and the Anti-Stereotyping Principle
Abortion laws that flow from disgust violate the anti-stereotyping prin-
ciple of sex equality law because they reflect an attempt to discipline women
for violating gender roles — the very behavior that provokes the disgust on
which those laws rest.  Such laws — which are likely numerous, if we are to
take moral psychology’s findings with respect to the abortion-disgust rela-
tionship seriously — are in tension with the anti-stereotyping principle be-
cause they embody an emotion (disgust) that indicates discomfort with
women acting “out of place” (as Douglas might say) or “out of role.”269  If
disgust for abortion often reflects discomfort with gender nonconforming
conduct (as social science suggests), and if abortion opposition and its resul-
tant laws are the product of this emotion (as moral psychology suggests),
then abortion laws embody the very stereotypes that Hibbs condemns and
are constitutionally vulnerable for that reason.
The theory of abortion and disgust presented here furthers the sex
equality project of conceptualizing the abortion right (and restrictive abor-
tion laws) in equality, in addition to liberty, terms.  Professor Reva Siegel’s
work on this project is exemplary.270  (Of course, Professor Siegel is neither
the first nor the only scholar to advance an equality argument for the abor-
tion right; numerous other scholars have done so over the past thirty
years.271)
269 See, e.g., DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at 44 (referring to dirt as
“matter out of place”).
270 It would not be an overstatement to say that the contemporary representative of that
project is Reva Siegel who has been viewing the rhetoric and reasoning of anti-abortion move-
ments (and the laws they produce) through an anti-stereotyping lens for twenty years. See
generally, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical Perspective on Abor-
tion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).
271 For the history of the rise, fall, and revival of sex equality arguments for reproductive
rights, see Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights, supra note 3, at 823–38.
Equality arguments in favor of the abortion right fall roughly into one of three categories, even
though, admittedly, the boundaries separating them are somewhat porous.  Some scholars
maintain that restrictive abortion laws constitute presumptively unconstitutional sex discrimi-
nation because they only apply to women. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016 (1984) (arguing that “[o]nly women become
pregnant; only women have abortions”); Sunstein, supra note 213, at 32–33 (arguing that
because abortion restrictions only affect women, they constitute facial or de jure sex classifica-
tions).  Others argue that restrictive abortion laws violate the Federal Equal Protection Clause
because they represent the sort of class, caste, and subordinating legislation that its framers
rejected. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 212, at 319–20 (arguing that abortion restrictions consti-
tute all three kinds of legislation and therefore violate an originalist interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment).  And still others argue that restrictive abortion laws violate the
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Siegel recently analyzed the rhetoric and reasoning that animated South
Dakota’s categorical abortion ban that was passed legislatively in 2006 (and
was overturned through voter referendum that same year).  In enacting that
law, the state legislature incorporated the findings of an abortion task force,
which maintained, among other things, that abortion restrictions were neces-
sary to protect women from “short- and long-term suffering.”272  Siegel ar-
gues that findings like this one reflect just the sort of sex stereotypical
reasoning about women’s “proper roles as wives and mothers”273 that
amounts to unconstitutional sex discrimination under Hibbs.
More generally speaking, Siegel argues that abortion restrictions, like
South Dakota’s, are unconstitutional under a sex-stereotyping theory of sex
discrimination when they are motivated, even in part, by views about wo-
men’s roles — and, in particular, by views about women’s roles as mothers,
as was the case in South Dakota.  She says:
I restrict myself to a narrow[] argument: that arguments for
criminalizing abortion can reflect judgments about women as well
as the unborn, and these judgments about women may be of a kind
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits government to enforce
by law.  If separate spheres views of women’s roles played a moti-
vating part in the enactment of abortion restrictions, the abortion
restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause.274
In Siegel’s view, then, even constitutionally licit rationales, like protect-
ing fetal life, will not save a law that also rests on constitutionally illicit sex
stereotyping.275  As long as sex stereotypes played a motivating part in driv-
ing restrictive abortion regimes — and not necessarily the motivating part —
Constitution’s sex equality guarantees when those laws rest on sex stereotypes, including “sep-
arate spheres views of women’s roles.”  Siegel, supra note 32, at 999.  This Article focuses on
this third kind of sex equality argument.
272 Siegel, supra note 32, at 1031.
273 Id. at 1002.
274 Id. at 999 (emphasis added).  Siegel has also suggested that abortion laws in which sex
stereotyping played a part might also be unconstitutional under Casey’s undue burden standard,
given that Casey made room for equality concerns under that standard. See Siegel, Dignity
and the Politics of Protection, supra note 3, at 1745; see also Franklin, supra note 14, at 158
(stating that “[e]quality concerns have played an implicit role in [Casey’s] undue burden
analysis”).
275 See, e.g., Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 3, at 1751 (stating
that “the joint opinion [in Casey] adopts an undue burden framework that insists that regula-
tion on behalf of potential life must assume a form that respects women’s dignity”).  In arguing
that abortion laws are unconstitutional if sex stereotypes played “a motivating part” in their
enactment, Professor Siegel is importing the Equal Protection Clause doctrine of neutral laws
with a disparate impact to the abortion context. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) (“When there is a proof that a discriminatory pur-
pose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justi-
fied.”); see also Pers. Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (applying the purpose
requirement to gender classifications).
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those regimes are not just presumptively, but actually, unconstitutional (in
her view).276
The key, of course, is in figuring out which abortion regimes are “moti-
vated” by constitutionally impermissible sex stereotypes and which ones are
not.  Professor Siegel’s work represents one way to make that determination,
namely, by focusing on the explicit rhetoric and reasoning of restrictive
abortion laws.
This Article offers another.  The relationships among abortion, disgust,
and sex stereotyping that this Article unearths suggest that we should be as
suspicious of abortion lawmaking that is driven by explicit expressions of
disgust (as with D&X legislation) as we are of abortion lawmaking that is
driven by explicit language about women’s roles as mothers (as with South
Dakota’s abortion law).277  Explicit expressions of disgust in abortion law-
making signal that sex stereotyping is afoot.  In Siegel’s terms, they raise the
strong possibility that “views of women’s roles” played “a motivating part”
in a law’s enactment.278  In Douglas’s terms, they suggest “cognitive discom-
fort” with behavior that violates “cherished classifications.”279  From a con-
stitutional sex equality perspective, explicit expressions of disgust in
abortion lawmaking are at least as troubling as explicit expressions about
women-as-mothers.
This Article has also shown, though, that focusing on the emotion of
disgust in abortion lawmaking also means being mindful of its implicit pres-
ence there.280  The wealth of empirical work by moral psychologists on the
relationships among disgust, moral judgment, and abortion opposition sug-
gests that disgust animates a much larger swath of abortion regulation than
276 According to Village of Arlington Heights, proof that discriminatory purpose played “a
motivating part” in a particular state action warrants strict scrutiny (at least in that case, which
dealt with alleged race discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause). 429 U.S. at 266. In other words, laws that are motivated by discriminatory racial
purpose are presumptively, not actually, unconstitutional, and might (although unlikely) sur-
vive the burdens of strict scrutiny.  By contrast, here Siegel is suggesting that abortion laws
that are motivated even in part by sex stereotypes amount to an actual equal protection viola-
tion.  Her recommendation is consistent, though, with the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence,
which has outright rejected as unconstitutional state action that (in the Court’s view) embodies
sex stereotypes. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 14, at 138 n.296 (observing that “since [inter-
mediate scrutiny] was introduced in 1976, the Court has never upheld a sex classification after
determining that it reflects or reinforces sex stereotypes” (citing Mary Anne Case, “The Very
Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect
Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2000))).
277 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
278 Siegel, supra note 32, at 999.
279 DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER, supra note 19, at xi (observing the “cognitive dis-
comfort caused by ambiguity”).
280 The literature on implicit bias in lawmaking (among other arenas) is far too large to
reference here.  That said, some notable recent contributions include Anthony G. Greenwald &
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 946 (2006);
Jerry Kang & Kristin Lang, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); and Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(2005).
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we might think.  This research raises the strong possibility that “views of
women’s roles” play “a motivating part in the enactment” of many, if not
most, restrictive abortion laws,281 even those laws that are completely neutral
on their face.282  In concluding, the next part briefly considers how the law
might handle this issue of implicit disgust (and, by extension, implicit sex
stereotyping) in abortion lawmaking.
IV. CONCLUSION: “RECKONING” WITH ABORTION DISGUST
In a landmark article on unconscious race discrimination and the Equal
Protection Clause written twenty-five years ago,283 titled The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, Professor
Charles Lawrence made a compelling case for why the insights of Freudian
theory and cognitive science on unconscious racism must be taken seriously
if the constitutional command of “equal protection” is to have meaning.  He
urged legal doctrine to be mindful of “twentieth century psychology,”284
which showed that racial discrimination is more often the product of “a col-
lective unconscious that we cannot observe directly” than the result of mali-
cious intent.285  He insisted that “equal protection doctrine must find a way
to come to grips with unconscious racism”286 if it is truly to guarantee
“equal opportunity.”287  And he argued that the way to do that would be for
courts to apply “strict scrutiny” to all government action — explicit and
neutral alike as far as discriminatory purpose is concerned — that “conveys
a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance.”288
When Professor Lawrence published his now iconic article in 1987, his
principal concern was twofold: First, he sought to convince the legal com-
munity that most racism was “id” racism rather than “ego” racism and
therefore was largely unreachable by equal protection doctrine and its dis-
criminatory purpose/intent requirement.  And second, he sought to offer a
test — the subjective cultural meaning test — to deal with this fact.  How-
281 Siegel, supra note 32, at 999.
282 On more than one occasion, Siegel has recognized that abortion laws might reflect
implicit, rather than explicit, sex stereotypes of the kind suggested here.  For instance, she has
cautioned that
[p]ronounced forms of underinclusivity or overinclusivity in the means by which
the state has pursued its interest in protecting maternal health or potential life might
reveal that abortion regulation is in fact driven by unconstitutional stereotypes about
women — “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in
the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas.”
Siegel, supra note 32, at 1052 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (citation
omitted)); see also Siegel, supra note 249, at 1896 n.120 (same).
283 Lawrence, supra note 33.
284 Id. at 324.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 323.
287 Id. at 326.
288 Id. at 324.
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ever, what he did not have to do was this: convince the legal community that
unconscious racism was something that it should care about.  In other words,
Professor Lawrence looked to cognitive science to establish that unconscious
racism existed, not to argue that it was a bad thing (that much was assumed).
This Article’s principal objective has been to persuade the legal commu-
nity why it should care about explicit and implicit disgust in abortion law-
making, particularly now that disgust is a valid basis for abortion regulation
and hundreds of restrictive abortion laws have been passed throughout the
United States over the past two years — many of which seem calculated to
provoke disgust for the abortion right more than anything else.  Like The Id,
The Ego, and Equal Protection, this Article looks to cognitive science —
specifically, to moral psychology — to establish three things: that disgust
for abortion exists; that disgust animates abortion opposition; and that dis-
gust likely underwrites a large swath of restrictive abortion laws, not just
those laws that target inflammatory abortion methods (D&X) and controver-
sial abortion issues (fetal pain).  Unlike Lawrence’s piece, though, this Arti-
cle makes the case for why we ought to care about disgust’s explicit and
implicit presence in abortion lawmaking in the first place.
For this reason, this Article has left unanswered the question of how the
legal community might “reckon with” abortion disgust in more concrete
ways — other than to acknowledge that it exists and is something that we
ought to care about.  Answering that question is well beyond the scope of
this Article’s more limited area of concern, even as it might represent its next
logical chapter.
With that being said, let me conclude here by offering just a few brief
suggestions with respect to what that “reckoning” might look like.  First,
and as argued above, explicit expressions of disgust in abortion lawmaking
ought to be treated the same as explicit expressions of women’s preferred
roles, and should thus trigger the application of heightened scrutiny.  Disgust
is such a potent disruptor of egalitarian norms that its overt presence in abor-
tion lawmaking ought to raise particular concern from a constitutional equal-
ity standpoint.  In the context of sexual orientation, overt disgust for sexual
minorities is both a constitutionally illegitimate reason for lawmaking under
rational basis review,289 as well as one of the reasons why some courts have
applied heightened scrutiny to state action that discriminates against gays
and lesbians.290  In other words, in that context, disgust has been relevant for
289 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (holding that morality does not
constitute a legitimate state interest under the Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635 (1996) (holding that animus or hostility against individuals on account of their mem-
bership in a class — there, sexual minorities — does not constitute even a legitimate state
interest under the Equal Protection Clause).
290 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 466 (Conn. 2008) (stating that
the fact that “gay persons . . . face virulent homophobia that rests on nothing more than
feelings of revulsion toward gay persons and the intimate sexual conduct with which they are
associated” and are the targets of “visceral prejudice” is relevant to a determination whether
sexual minorities constitute a quasi-suspect class for state equal protection purposes).
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courts on the back end of a constitutional analysis (as a reason to strike
down state action) as well as on the front end (as one factor to consider when
determining what level of review to apply to state action in the first place).
There is no reason to treat explicit expressions of disgust in abortion law-
making any differently, particularly given the sex stereotyping that such ex-
pressions signal.
However, it is likely the case that most disgust in abortion lawmaking
is implicit, not explicit.  Thus, just as “equal protection doctrine must find a
way to come to grips with unconscious racism,”291 so too must abortion doc-
trine find a way to come to grips with implicit disgust and sex stereotyping
in abortion regulation.  One possibility is simply to assume that all abortion
regulations are presumptively unconstitutional because they are likely driven
by an emotion that is in tension with constitutional equality norms, particu-
larly after Hibbs.  Professor Nussbaum has made a similar proposal with
respect to all laws targeting sexual minorities.  Currently, such laws, like
abortion laws, are afforded only rational basis review under the Federal
Equal Protection Clause.292  Nussbaum contends that the “pervasiveness” of
negative stereotypes about gay people justifies replacing rationality analysis
with heightened scrutiny for all sexual orientation classifications — even, or
especially, those classifications where malicious intent is lacking.293  In her
view, heightened scrutiny is necessary “[t]o root out discrimination in such
cases.”294  So too here might we argue that the “pervasiveness” of disgust in
abortion lawmaking, coupled with an understanding of what that disgust
means, justifies the application of heightened scrutiny to all abortion classifi-
cations, even those classifications where disgust is facially absent.
These are just suggestions about how the law might translate the in-
sights of psychology and social science into legal doctrine.  This Article has
taken the necessary first step toward achieving that translation by arguing
291 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 323.
292 For sexual orientation classifications, see Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32 (applying rational
basis review only to a sexual orientation classification).  For abortion laws, see Tucson Wo-
man’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 548 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that heightened scrutiny
does not necessarily apply to abortion restrictions reviewed under the Equal Protection Clause
after Hibbs because “Hibbs does not compel the conclusion that [gender] discrimination [in
the abortion context is the sort] a court can remedy”); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,
222 F.3d 157, 173–75 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a South Carolina
regulation establishing licensure and operational requirements for physicians’ offices and med-
ical clinics that performed five or more first trimester abortions per month, and applying only
rational basis review to that regulation).  With respect to abortion laws reviewed under the Due
Process Clause, commentators have argued that Casey’s undue burden standard, which re-
placed Roe’s strict scrutiny standard, constitutes something lower than strict scrutiny and closer
to rational basis review. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 686–87 (1994) (arguing that Casey rendered the
fundamental right established by Roe less fundamental); Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment,
Workability of the Undue Burden Standard, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1028–31 (1993) (arguing
that Casey set forth a rationality standard for abortion restrictions).
293 NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 9, at 122.
294 Id.
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why disgust’s role in abortion law is even an issue that we should care about
at all.  The theory of abortion and disgust that it develops establishes a foun-
dation for thinking more broadly and more critically about the myriad forms
that sex discrimination assumes, as well as the myriad ways in which restric-
tive abortion regimes inflict “sex-based harms.”295  More narrowly, the the-
ory it offers provides yet another reason to remain skeptical of disgust in all
lawmaking, and particularly in lawmaking that bears on identity interests so
directly.
295 Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemp-
tions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169,
1228 (2012) (arguing that reproductive rights “have suffered from an inability of courts and
lawmakers to understand infringements on reproductive freedom as sex-based harms”).
